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ABSTRACT 
When World war II began in September 1939, polls 
indicated that most Americans believed it did not pose a 
threat to the United States and opposed any involvement by a 
ratio of 27-to-1. 
President Franklin Roosevelt perceived that the power 
of Nazi Germany and its ideals posed a threat to American 
democracy. He presented the war to the American public as a 
moral struggle as well as one for security. The President 
publicized this view most notably in his Four Freedoms 
speech and in the Atlantic Charter. Both statements defined 
the moral goals of basic human freedoms and national self-
dejtermination. 
Most Americans embraced the moral goals of the war when 
the United States went to war in December 1941. Those goals 
were challenged when American forces under General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower invaded French North Africa on November 8, 1942. 
French North Africa was then controlled by the quasi-fascist 
French government located in Vichy. To save lives, and to 
speed conquest of the area, Eisenhower secured the surrender 
of the French forces from Admiral Jean Francois Darlan, a 
Vichy official. Darlan's fascist background seemed to 
contradict Roosevelt's moral crusade. 
News of the "Darlan Deal" provoked a public outcry. 
Dozens of editorials appeared in American and British 
newspapers criticizing Eisenhower's action. Most of these 
editorials argued that deals with fascists violated the 
moral basis for the war. Other fascists, it seemed, might 
also be accommodated in the future. Eisenhower was also 
accused of betraying the Free French, under General Charles 
de Gaulle, who had challenged Vichy for the loyalty of the 
French people. 
Roosevelt attempted to quiet criticism by referring to 
Darlan as a "temporary expedient" who would ultimately 
answer to the French people. This explanation met temporary 
acceptance, but skepticism increased as time passed. 
Darlan's assassination on December 24, 1942 allowed 
Roosevelt to renew the Allied commitment to destroying 
fascism. The Darlan Deal played a large role in Roosevelt's 
pledge to accept nothing less than Unconditional Surrender 
from the Axis powers at the Casablanca Conference in January 
1943. 
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CHAPTER I 
FORMING AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION 
What drives nations to war-and what stirs the general 
public to strong support of an armed conflict that may not 
even directly affect them? 
1 
In World War II, moral indignation proved the defining 
factor in keeping public support of the Allied cause strong. 
Even before the United States entered the war in 1941, 
American political leaders framed the conflict as one of 
great moral significance: Nazism and fascism versus 
individual rights; totalitarian states versus democratic 
nations; good versus evil. 
With the war cast in this light, the political and 
military figures of the time came to symbolize their 
respective causes. Hitler became the embodiment of evil, 
personifying totalitarianism and fascism; Churchill and 
Roosevelt became the embodiments of liberty and democracy. 
Even less significant figures received this treatment. 
According to the Allied propaganda, Admiral Jean Fran~ois 
Darlan, a minister in the semi-fascist Vichy French regime, 
was a betrayer of democracy for the policies he endorsed. 
Darlan proved unable to escape this portrayal, even after he 
came over to the Allied side in November 1942. 
Why frame the war in this manner? Both the Allied and 
Axis sides used rhetoric to mold public opinion in favor of 
2 
their side of the war. People are more apt to support a 
moral and just cause than one of outright aggression. So, to 
earn public support, the Allies needed public opinion on 
their side. 
This was no easy task for United States President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt. The American public at the outset of 
World War II did not support the United States' entry into 
another armed conflict in Europe, especially one fought only 
for personal or national gain. After world war I, a definite 
isolationist sentiment captured America. Fearing that the 
League of Nations Covenant would drag the United States into 
future foreign conflicts, the Senate failed to ratify it. 
This isolationist sentiment continued to pervade American 
public opinion throughout the period between the wars. This 
sentiment was deepened by the findings of the "Nye 
Committee." In 1934, the United States Senate formed the 
Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry, 
headed by Senator Gerald P. Nye, to uncover the economic 
roots of world war I. 1 After reviewing corporate and 
government files and listening to hours of testimony from 
business leaders, the committee reported that the munitions 
industry, seeing the potential for large profits, had 
lobbied for and promoted America's entrance into World war 
1Wayne s. Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye and American 
Foreign Relations (Minneapolis: university of Minnesota 
Press, 1962), 66. 
I. This pursuit of profits, the Nye Committee claimed, was 
a primary cause for war. 2 By focusing on the economic 
aspects of war, the Nye Committee reinforced the public's 
belief that war allowed a minority of individuals to profit 
at the expense of the majority. 
3 
President Franklin Roosevelt attempted to move American 
public opinion from its opposition to military force in a 
speech he delivered on October 5, 1937. In his speech, the 
president sought to convince the American public that force 
could actually be used to enhance world peace. The "peace-
loving nations must mete a concerted effort in opposition to 
those ... creating a state of international anarchy and 
instability from which there is no escape through mere 
isolation or neutrality." Roosevelt proposed that aggressor 
nations be placed in a form of "quarantine." 3 
The response of the American public was not what 
Roosevelt had hoped for. The Catholic Association for 
International Peace supported the quarantine approach, but 
claimed the policy "need not, and in our opinion, must not 
mean war." The American Federation of Labor also endorsed 
Roosevelt's speech, but at the same time it declared its 
opposition to American involvement in "European or Asiatic 
2Ibid., 95-96. 
3Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign 
American Policy, 1932-1941 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1979), 148. 
wars." American newspapers also supported the quarantine 
proposal, as long as "these actions would not lead to 
war ... "4 
4 
Despite Roosevelt's efforts, he could not shake the 
American public's anti-war sentiment. A November 8, 1939 
Gallup Poll indicated that 68 percent of Americans felt that 
American involvement in World war I had been a mistake. 5 By 
the early 1940s, this anti-war sentiment had begun to give 
life to various isolationist groups, whose goal was to keep 
the United States out of World war II. These groups, such 
as the America First Committee, the Keep America Out of war 
Committee, and the Women's International League for Peace 
and Freedom, justified their stance by citing public opinion 
polls that showed the majority of the American public was 
opposed to the United States entry into the war. 6 
For example, a December 8, 1939 Gallup poll indicated 
that Americans opposed entry into World war II by a margin 
of 27-to-l. 7 Although the degree of the public's resistance 
to entering the war would change over the years, the vast 
majority of Americans remained opposed to entering the 
4Ibid., 151. 
5American Institute of Public Opinion (The Gallup 
Poll), Gallup Poll Reports: 1935-1968 (Princeton, NJ: 
American Institute of Public Opinion, 1969), 104. 
6Wayne s. Cole, America First: The Battle Against 
Intervention 1940-1941 (Madison, Wisconsin: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1953), 53. 
7 Gallup Poll Reports, 105. 
5 
conflict. A May 29, 1940 Gallup Poll showed that although 
more Americans now favored entering World War II than in 
earlier polls, those opposed to U.S. involvement outnumbered 
those favoring war by a margin of 13-to-l. 8 
The German defeat of France in June 1940 seemed to 
further justify the isolationist attitude. France, widely 
considered to have the strongest army in the world, 
certainly had the strongest in Europe. The French had 
fielded the largest Allied contingent in World war I and one 
of France's most famous generals of that war, Marshal Henri 
Petain, continued to wield political and military 
influence. 9 A Gallup Poll conducted in America on October 
13, 1940, after the French defeat, showed that 83 percent of 
those planning to vote in the upcoming U.S. elections in 
November opposed involvement in the war. 10 
What the American public failed to realize, however, was 
that fascism's aggressive tendencies posed a threat to the 
united States. Adolf Hitler, in particular, planned to 
eventually fight a war with the United States. Although his 
opinions changed over time, Hitler always viewed the United 
States as a future adversary. In the 1920s, Hitler's 
8Gallup Poll Reports, 110. 
9Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World At Arms: A Global 
History of World war II {Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 84. 
10Gallup Poll Reports, 115. 
statements indicated that he viewed the United States as a 
nation that maintained a pure Nordic racial makeup through 
an essentially racist immigration policy. With vast 
available living area and resources, the American racial 
stock posed a real threat to Germany superiority. One of 
the goals of National Socialism was to prepare Germany for 
the eventual conflict with the United States. 11 
6 
Hitler's statements about the United States changed in 
the early 1930s. The German dictator felt America had been 
permanently weakened by the Great Depression, especially due 
to the influence of African-Americans and Jews. 12 But 
Hitler still felt that Germany would have to defeat the 
united States, 13 especially since he hoped to dominate 
Mexico and Latin America some day. 14 
Roosevelt resolved to convince the American public of the 
fascist threat and to gain support for his policies. This 
would justify further support of a war and eventual United 
States entry into the conflict-all to support the Allies' 
goals and to keep the world free for democracy, self-
determination, and human rights. 
11Gerhard L. Weinberg, Foreign Policy of Hitler's 
Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe 1933-36 (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1970), 21. 
12Weinberg, Foreign Policy 1933-36, 21. 
13Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's 
Germany: Starting world war II, 1937-1939 (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1980), 252. 
14Weinberg, Foreign Policy 1933-36, 22. 
In order to secure popular support for his programs, and 
to prepare the country for even greater commitments to the 
Allies, Roosevelt had to blunt the arguments of the 
isolationists. He did this in a "Fireside Chat" radio 
broadcast on December 29, 1940. In this broadcast, the 
President warned listeners that should the Axis powers win 
world war II and gain control of Europe, Asia, Africa, and 
the Pacific, "all of us, in all the Americas, would be 
living at the point of a gun-a gun loaded with explosive 
bullets economic as well as military. "15 
7 
Roosevelt argued that the solution to this threat was not 
to encourage a negotiated peace, as advocated by the 
isolationists, but rather to send aid to opponents of 
aggression. Sending armaments to England would not commit 
the United States to entering the war, the President said. 
Instead, it would allow the Allies to continue to fight for 
their own liberty and American security. 16 Roosevelt said: 
We must be the great arsenal of democracy. For us 
this is an emergency as serious as war itself. We 
must apply ourselves to our task with the same 
resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same 
spirit of patriotism and sacrifice as we would 
show were we at war. 17 
15Dallek, 256. 
16Ibid., 256-257. 
17Ibid., 257. 
8 
After this statement, messages to the White House ran 
100-to-1 in favor of the speech. A public opinion poll 
conducted soon after the broadcast showed that 80 percent of 
those who had heard or read the speech approved of it; only 
12 percent opposed it. Moreover, Roosevelt's Fireside Chat 
had been heard or read by more of the American public than 
any previous speech by the President. 18 A Gallup Poll 
conducted the next day showed that 60 percent of U.S. voters 
favored aiding Great Britain. 19 
Encouraged by the results of his Fireside Chat, Roosevelt 
planned to formally propose aid to the Allies. To further 
emphasize the Allied need for American armaments, and to 
strengthen public support, the President framed the war in 
moral terms. He did this in his "Four Freedoms" speech, 
which he delivered on January 6, 1941. 
The Allied leadership put forward two basic statements 
that outlined the foundation of the Allied cause: the "Four 
Freedoms" speech and the Atlantic Charter. To the American 
public, these statements defined the moral purpose of the 
war. They gave the public a clear reason to change their 
views from isolationist withdrawal to outward support of the 
Allied cause. In the Four Freedoms speech, the President 
18Ibid., 257-258. 
19Gallup Poll Reports, 118. 
argued that the fascist nations posed a direct threat to 
democracy in general and the United States in particular: 
Every realist knows that the democratic way of 
life is at this moment being directly assailed in 
every part of the world-assailed either by arms, 
or by secret spreading of poisonous propaganda by 
those who seek to destroy unity and promote 
discord in nations still at peace .... 
I find it necessary to report that the future and 
safety of our country and of our democracy are 
overwhelmingly involved in events far beyond our 
borders .... 
The first phase of the invasion of this Hemisphere 
would not be the landing of regular troops. The 
necessary strategic points would be occupied by 
secret agents and their dupes-great numbers of 
them are already here, and in Latin America .... 
As long as the aggressor nations maintain the 
offensive, they-not we-will choose the time and 
the place and the method of their attack. 20 
After saying that the Axis nations posed a direct threat 
to the United States, Roosevelt argued that the United 
States had to lend all possible support to the Allied 
countries. The Allied countries had long traditions of 
democratic institutions and respect for individual rights 
which needed to be upheld. 
The Axis countries, however, had replaced their 
democratic institutions with fascist governments. Fascist 
governments sought to institute a totalitarian system that 
2
°Franklin Roosevelt, "State of the Union Address, " 
<http://www.libertynet.org/~edcivic/fdr.html>, 6 January 
1942. 
9 
glorified the nation and its people, not the individual. 
This took the form of extreme nationalism, where other 
nationalities or ethnic groups were considered inferior. 
This manifested itself in acts of war and aggression to 
accomplish the subjugation of "inferior" peoples. 
10 
Roosevelt used the Four Freedoms speech to argue that the 
United States could fight these anti-democratic ideas by 
supplying arms to Britain and the other countries opposing 
Germany. In this way, the United States would act "as an 
arsenal for them as for ourselves." 21 Using its arms, 
money, and influence, the united States' goal was to create 
a world based on what Roosevelt defined as the four basic 
human freedoms: speech, religion, prosperity, and security. 
The first is freedom of speech and expression-
everywhere in the world. The second is freedom of 
every person to worship God in his own way-
everywhere in the world. The third is freedom 
from want-which, translated into world terms, 
means economic understandings which will secure to 
every nation a healthy peace time life for its 
inhabitants-everywhere in the world. The fourth 
is freedom from fear-which translated into world 
terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments 
to such a point and in such a fashion that no 
nation will be in a position to commit an act of 
physical aggression against any neighbor-anywhere 
in the world .... That kind of world is the very 
antithesis of the so-called new order of tyranny 
which the dictators seek to create with the crash 
of a bomb. 22 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
11 
The President's statement alarmed isolationists, who 
interpreted the speech as Roosevelt's attempt to commit the 
United States as the "guardian of the world's virtue. "23 
But the overall mood of the nation seemed to be changing. A 
January 24, 1941 Gallup Poll indicated that two out of three 
American voters now favored aid to Britain. 24 
For his part, Roosevelt sought to reinforce the nation's 
commitment to the moral policy of restoring or advancing the 
Four Freedoms throughout the world. Moreover, he aimed to 
identify his Four Freedoms policy with assistance to Great 
Britain. 25 In doing so, he hoped to eliminate the political 
stalemate between the isolationists and the interventionists 
in Congress and in the country. 26 Even though the United 
States was not yet in the war, Roosevelt sought to educate 
the public about the ideals and beliefs the war was about. 
When the United States eventually entered the war, as the 
President felt it would, the public would be willing to work 
long hours, support rationing, and send their sons to fight 
in foreign countries, all sacrifices necessary to achieve 
victory. 
23Thomas N. Guinsburg, The Pursuit of Isolationism in 
the United States Senate from Versailles to Pearl Harbor 
(New York: Garland Publishing, 1982), 255. 
24Gallup Poll Reports, 119. 
25Douglas Brinkley and David R. Facey-Crowther, ed., 
The Atlantic Charter (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 
11-12. 
26 Ibid. , 14. 
12 
Roosevelt seized the opportunity to further promote his 
goal when he, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and 
their advisors agreed to secretly meet off the coast of 
Newfoundland in August 1941. The moment Roosevelt awaited 
came at the end of the conference, when the British and 
American leaders signed the Atlantic Charter. 
Taking its cue from Roosevelt's Four Freedoms, the 
Atlantic Charter reinforced and expanded the President's 
moral statements and established a set of common policy 
goals. Here, in essence, was a description of principles 
that the Allies, including the United States, felt that war 
was being fought for. 
The Atlantic Charter established eight key principles, 
each based on democratic ideals and respect for national and 
individual rights and freedoms: 
First, their countries [the United States and the 
United Kingdom] seek no aggrandizement, 
territorial or other; 
Second, they desire to see no territorial changes 
that do not accord with the freely expressed 
wishes of the people concerned; 
Third, they respect the right of all peoples to 
choose the form of government under which they 
will live; and they wish to see sovereign right 
and self government restored to those who have 
been forcibly deprived of them; 
Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for 
their existing obligations, to further the 
enjoyment of all States, great of small, victor or 
vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the 
trade and to the raw materials of the world which 
are needed for their economic prosperity; 
Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest 
collaboration between all nations in the economic 
field with the object of securing, for all, 
improved labor standards, economic advancement and 
social security; 
Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi 
tyranny, they hope to see established a peace 
which will afford to all nations the means of 
dwelling in safety within their borders, and which 
will afford assurance that all the men in all 
lands may live out their lives in freedom from 
fear and want; 
Seventh, such a peace should enable men to 
traverse the high seas and oceans without 
hindrance; 
Eighth, they believe that all the nations of the 
world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons 
must come to the abandonment of the use of 
force. 27 
13 
The Atlantic Charter asserted the intention of the United 
States to restore democratic values to the European 
countries wrecked by war. The obstacle to the advancement 
of these goals was Nazi Germany. 
Roosevelt did not expect to convince the public to 
embrace entry into World War II immediately. Public opinion 
polls showed that the American public still opposed taking 
an active role in the war; 74 percent still opposed 
involvement-only a one percent drop from a pre-conference 
poll. Indeed, the Atlantic Conference failed to drain 
support away from the isolationists, who berated the 
27
"Joint Declaration of the President of the United 
States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain." The 
Department of State Bulletin V (16 August 1941): 125-126. 
Atlantic Charter for ignoring the freedoms of religion and 
speech. 28 
14 
At the same time, however, an August 24 Gallup Poll 
showed that 73 percent of the public strongly supported the 
President's foreign policy. 29 This signified that the 
public recognized the principles at stake in World war II 
and approved of Roosevelt's efforts to help the Allies. 
Roosevelt had succeeded in adding a moral element to the 
discussion of American involvement in the war, a point 
which Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter raised in a 
letter to the President just days after the conference: 
We live by symbols and we can't too often recall 
them ... And you two in that ocean ... Gave meaning 
to the conflict between civilization and arrogant, 
brute challenge; and gave promise more powerful 
and binding than any formal treaty could, that 
civilization has brains and resources that tyranny 
will not be able to overcome ... The deed and the 
spirit and the invigoration breathed there in the 
hearts of men will endure and will kindle actions 
toward the goal of ridding the world of this 
horror. 30 
The American public came to regard the Four Freedoms and the 
Atlantic Charter as the moral basis of American policy 
before and after the United States' entrance into the war. 
28Dallek, 284-285. 
29Gallup Poll Reports, 126. 
30Dallek, 284. 
15 
The first real test of these principles did not come 
until after the United States had been in the war for almost 
a year; however, it proved a decisive moment for the United 
States-Allied policy. In hopes of gaining a base of 
operations for an eventual move into southern Europe, 
British and American forces, in an operation code-named 
TORCH, landed in French North Africa on November 8, 1942. 
France was then ruled by a quasi-fascist government at 
Vichy. This government had signed an armistice with Nazi 
Germany in July 1940. 
At the time of the American landings, the French Minister 
of Marine, Admiral Jean Fran~ois Darlan, was located in 
Algiers, the administrative capital of French North Africa. 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, the commander of the North African 
invasion force, agreed to recognize Darlan's authority as 
head of the French North African administration in return 
for a cease-fire agreement. 
Negotiating with Darlan was a calculated risk for 
Eisenhower. As a member of the Vichy government, Darlan had 
instituted authoritarian policies and collaborated with the 
Nazis. In addition, recognizing and preserving Darlan's 
authority was sure to anger Charles de Gaulle's exiled Free 
French organization, which had continued to resist the 
Germans even after the French defeat. More importantly, 
negotiating with Darlan raised the specter of appeasement, 
suggesting that the Allies were not as committed to 
eliminating fascism as they claimed. 
16 
Eisenhower recognized Darlan's significance. Only 
Darlan, as the appointed successor to the Vichy Premier, 
Marshal Petain, had the authority to give orders to the 
French soldiers and sailors in North Africa. Only Darlan 
could order the French troops to cease their resistance to 
Allied forces. Eisenhower's negotiations saved American and 
British lives and allowed the Allies to advance more rapidly 
against German positions in Tunisia. 
Despite these advantages, the "Darlan Deal" caused a 
public uproar in the united States and Great Britain. To 
the public, it seemed as if the Allies were abandoning their 
proclaimed principles of restoring democratic institutions 
and eliminating fascism, as embodied in the Four Freedoms 
and the Atlantic Charter. 
Negotiating seemed to suggest to the Allied public that 
the threat posed by fascism was not as great as originally 
portrayed. The public demanded an explanation for the 
Darlan Deal; if fascism did not pose a threat to democracy, 
then why were the American and British peoples sacrificing 
so much for the war effort? The public outcry against the 
Darlan Deal became so great that President Roosevelt was 
moved to make the unconditional surrender pledge during the 
Casablanca Conference to restore the moral basis for the 
war. 
CHAPTER II 
ENTER DARLAN 
17 
Darlan's rise to political power began during the German 
invasion of France. On May 10, 1940, the German army 
crossed the border into Belgium and the Netherlands. To the 
world, it appeared as if Germany intended to invade France 
as it had during World War I, through the Low Countries. 
The British and French armies stationed in France quickly 
responded to the German threat by crossing into Belgium and 
taking up defensive positions. 31 
However, on May 14, German tanks broke through the 
Ardennes Forest, long thought impassable, along the French-
German border. Motorized infantry and armored corps 
followed the tank units into France to reinforce German 
positions. Once secure inside France, the German tanks 
turned toward the English Channel, trapping the French and 
British armies in Belgium between two German armies. 32 
With the French army surrounded and the Germans advancing 
toward Paris, the French Premier, Paul Reynaud, appointed 
Marshal Henri Petain to the position of vice-premier on May 
18. Reynaud later claimed that he brought Petain into the 
31William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third 
Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Touchstone, 
1981}, 713. 
32 Ibid., 723-724. 
18 
French cabinet because the marshal was one of France's most 
popular military figures. Reynaud said he felt Petain's 
prestige would strengthen the public's morale. 33 
Whatever benefit Petain's presence in the cabinet may 
have brought, it did not slow the advance of the German 
armies. On June 14, the German army entered Paris and the 
French Government relocated to Bordeaux. It seemed as if 
France would be completely overrun by the Germans. 34 
The following day, British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill received a telegram from Reynaud, asking the Prime 
Minister to release France from its pledge not to seek a 
separate peace with the Germans. On June 16, the French 
cabinet received official permission from its British ally 
to ask for armistice terms, but the British cabinet included 
one important condition: 
On condition, but only on condition that the 
French fleet shall be directed to British ports 
pending negotiations, the Government of His 
Majesty gives its full consent to an inquiry by 
the French Government with a view to finding out 
the conditions for an armistice. His Majesty's 
Government being determined to continue the war, 
will abstain completely from any part in this 
inquiry concerning an armistice. 3 
33William L. Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1947), 7-9. 
34Weinberg, 13 8. 
35Langer, 3 6-3 7. 
19 
To prevent a French surrender, later that same day 
Churchill proposed a union of France and the United Kingdom, 
the first such union since Henry V had defeated the French 
army and concluded the Treaty of Troyes in 1420. 36 The plan 
would have set up a single war cabinet that would control 
the armed forces of both nations for the remainder of the 
war. 37 
General Charles De Gaulle, Reynaud's representative in 
London, especially favored the idea and urged the British 
cabinet to approve the union. 38 Reynaud introduced the 
proposal to the French cabinet, but it was never seriously 
considered. Petain rejected the proposal saying it was just 
a British device to prevent an armistice. 39 Other French 
cabinet officers discarded the union proposal as a British 
plot to acquire French colonial possessions. 40 
A discouraged Reynaud resigned the night of June 16; he 
was replaced by Marshal Petain. Although the French 
President asked Reynaud to form a new cabinet composed of 
members favoring resistance, Reynaud refused. 41 The next 
36John Charmley, Churchill: The End of Glory (New York: 
Harcourt Brace & Company, 1993), 415. 
37Langer, 3 8 . 
38Weinberg, A world At Arms, 139-140. 
39Langer, 3 8 . 
4
°Charmley, 415. 
41Langer, 3 9 . 
20 
day, Petain, through the Spanish ambassador to France, asked 
the Germans for armistice terms. 42 
Petain replaced those ministers who favored continued 
resistance against the Germans with supporters of an 
armistice. As his Minister of Marine, Petain selected a 
high-ranking naval officer and a long-time associate, 
Admiral Jean Darlan. 43 
Admiral Darlan was no stranger to politics; from 1926-
1939, he served as chief of staff for the French minister of 
the navy. The position gave him close access to important 
members of the French Third Republic, a connection he used 
to gain funds for increased naval construction. Under 
Darlan's supervision, the French navy had reached its 
largest size ever. Despite its apparent strengths, though, 
the navy never distinguished itself in the war against the 
Axis. 44 
Darlan, however, remained committed to the Allied cause. 
After the Soviet Union, then Allied with Nazi Germany, 
invaded Finland in 1940, for example, the admiral wanted to 
send forces to aid the Finns. Darlan argued that the Allies 
could send troops to Finland by going through Norway and 
42Shirer, 738. 
43Alec De Montmorency, The Enigma of Admiral Darlan. 
(New York: E.P. Dutton, 1943), 87-88. 
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Sweden. This would also allow the Allies to control the 
flow of Norwegian iron ore through Sweden to Germany. When 
the Germans invaded Norway itself in 1940, Darlan remained 
active in planning Allied resistance to the German 
landings . 45 
The French navy could do to little to prevent the 
collapse of the French army after the Germans invaded, 
although Darlan did command the French navy at Dunkirk and 
helped evacuate the British and French troops trapped there. 
For his efforts, he was recognized by the British 
government. 46 However, ten days after receiving this award, 
Darlan arrived in Bourdeaux to assume his position as 
Minister of Marine, in a government seeking an armistice 
with the Germans. Since the French army had been defeated, 
the only bargaining piece the French had left was their 
fleet. As head of France's only remaining military force, 
Darlan was bound to become a major player in Petain's 
government. 47 
Aside from the importance the French fleet would grant 
him, Darlan seemed to have another reason to favor an 
armistice with Germany. The admiral, like many in Petain's 
cabinet, felt the war was all but over; Darlan predicted a 
45Ibid. 
46De Montmorency, 87. 
47Paxton, 111. 
British surrender in eight weeks. 48 Why prolong a losing 
conflict and risk receiving harsher terms? 
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It may have been for this reason that Darlan opposed the 
British demand to send the French fleet to the United 
Kingdom. While the British had a vested interest in seeing 
that the French fleet did not fall into German hands, Darlan 
also had a vested interest in keeping the fleet in French 
territory. Sending the fleet to Britain would eliminate 
Darlan's basis of power and would also deprive France of its 
most important bargaining chip, possibly to see it used as a 
bargaining chip by the British in a few months. 49 
However, the Americans, like the British, were seriously 
concerned about the fate of the French fleet. Roosevelt was 
so concerned that his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, sent 
a message urging the French Government to refuse any German 
demand to surrender the French fleet. The American 
ambassador to France delivered this message to both the 
French foreign minister and Admiral Darlan on June 18. 50 
The message read, in part: 
The President desires you to say that in the 
opinion of this Government, should the French 
Government, before concluding any armistice with 
the Germans, fail to see that the fleet is kept 
out of the hands or her opponents, the French 
48Langer, 43. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. , 45. 
Government will be pursuing a policy which will 
fatally impair the preservation of the French 
Empire and the eventual restoration of French 
independence and autonomy. Furthermore, should 
the French Government fail to take these steps and 
permit the French Fleet to be surrendered to 
Germany, the French Government will permanently 
lose the friendship and goodwill of the Government 
of the united States. 51 
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The foreign minister brought the American message to the 
French cabinet. To reassure the Americans, the cabinet 
voted to refuse any German demand to surrender the fleet and 
informed the American and British ambassadors of the French 
Government's action. 52 
The next day, June 19, 1940, a British delegation arrived 
to seek further French assurances on the status of the 
fleet. The delegation consisted of Lord Lloyd, Admiral Sir 
Dudley Pound, and Albert Alexander, the First Lord of the 
Adrniralty. 53 Since it seemed evident that France would 
accept German armistice terms, Alexander proposed that the 
French fleet be transferred to America for the duration of 
the war. This Darlan would not accept. Sending the fleet 
to America would weaken France's bargaining position with 
the Germans-and eliminate the basis of Darlan's own power. 
"Marshal Petain has given the British Government his 
soldier's word that he will not surrender a single unit of 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. , 45-46. 
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the French Fleet to the foes of Great Britain," Darlan said. 
"You also have my word. Is that not a sufficient guarantee 
for you?" Alexander replied, "We have no use for words." At 
Alexander's words, Petain rose from the table and the last 
British and French allied meeting came to an end. 54 
France signed the armistice with Germany at Compiegne, 
the site of the World War I armistice, on June 21, 1940. 
The terms were harsh, but allowed France to retain some 
sovereignty. While the Channel and Atlantic coasts were 
occupied, the French government was allowed to retain 
control of southern areas, essentially creating a rump 
state. The French government also retained control of its 
colonial holdings, but had to pay massive reparations. 55 
Most important to Great Britain, the armistice recalled the 
French navy to metropolitan French ports where they would be 
demilitarized for the duration of the war. 56 
The fall of France radically changed American public 
opinion. In May 1940, before the French surrender, a poll 
of American public opinion found that 33 percent of 
Americans favored American funding of the British war 
effort, even if it meant war between the United States and 
Germany. A slightly greater group, 38 percent, opposed a 
54 Ibid., 91-92. 
55Weinberg, A world At Arms, 140. 
56Ibid. , 145. 
United States entrance into the war, but still favored aid 
to Britain and France. Only 23 percent opposed all aid to 
the Allied countries.~ 
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After the French defeat, American public opinion had 
changed greatly. Britain fought Germany alone. Fifty-three 
percent of Americans now stated that they gave a higher 
priority to defeating Hitler than keeping the U.S. out of 
the war. This figure rose to 68 percent by December. Only 
12 percent of those polled still favored strict 
neutrality. 58 For the first time, a clear consensus was 
developing that fascism posed a threat to America itself. 
The American government shared the anxiety of its 
populace toward Hitler. In order to curtail German 
influence in France, the U.S. government centered its 
foreign policy on three goals: to prevent the French navy 
from being used by the Germans; to prevent Axis control of 
French territories in Africa and North America; and to 
prevent French collaboration with the Germans. 59 This 
policy was clearly spelled out by President Roosevelt in a 
letter to Marshal Petain on October 25, 1940: 
The Government of the United States received from 
the Petain Government during the first days it 
57Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America 1935-1941 
(Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), 214. 
58Ibid., 215. 
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held office the most solemn assurances that the 
French Fleet would not be surrendered. If the 
French Government now permits the Germans to use 
the French Fleet in hostile operations against the 
British Fleet, such action would constitute a 
flagrant and deliberate breach of faith with the 
United States Government. 
Any agreement entered into between France and 
Germany which partook of the character above 
mentioned would most definitely wreck the 
traditional friendship between the French and 
American peoples, would permanently remove any 
chance that this Government would be disposed to 
give any assistance to the French people in their 
distress, and would create a wave of bitter 
indignation against France on the part of the 
American public opinion60 
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On December 14, 1940, the American charge d'affaires met 
with Admiral Darlan. This was a particularly important 
meeting as the admiral was about to become vice-president of 
the council; in effect, Petain's prime minister. Darlan 
reassured the American diplomat that the French navy and 
French territories would never be surrendered to the Axis. 
However, Darlan said the Germans would probably win the war, 
which would be better for France. If the British won the 
war, Darlan said, they would take valuable colonies like 
Madagascar and Dakar from France, but Germany would take 
less important territories like Alsace and Lorraine ("which 
are lost anyway") , the Cameroons and British Nigeria. 61 
60 Ibid., 97. 
61 Ibid., 116-117. 
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Darlan went on to denounce the British. He claimed the 
British high command was composed of imbeciles, and 
condemned the unreliability of "the drunkard Churchill." 
Although the French fleet would never be surrendered to the 
Germans, the French might attack Gibraltar if the British 
attempted to blockade France. "With Spanish and German help 
the Rock wouldn't hold out long," Darlan claimed. 62 
Darlan's argument had some basis in fact; the Spanish 
government had been aided by the Germans and Italians during 
the Spanish civil war in the 1930s. If Spain decided to 
enter the war on the Axis side, Gibraltar would certainly be 
attacked. 
American foreign relations with Vichy France served 
another purpose. By keeping relations with France open, 
Roosevelt hoped to gain information that the United States 
could use later, during an American invasion of French North 
African territory. Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt's speech 
writer, claimed that the president had begun planning in 
August 1940 for an African invasion, months after France had 
surrendered to Germany and over a year before the U.S. 
entered the war. 
Sherwood reported that Roosevelt had also prepared a map 
of the eastern coastal defenses of the United States. The 
president showed the map to Harry Hopkins, one of the 
62 Ibid., 117. 
Roosevelt's top aides, and argued that only 1.5 percent of 
the American coastline could be defended against invasion. 
An enemy could choose from any number of points to make a 
landing. 63 
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Bearing this fact in mind, Roosevelt argued that American 
forces should pre-empt an attack by first landing on enemy-
held territory. "On the northwest coast of Africa, for 
instance," the president told Hopkins. 64 Roosevelt was no 
doubt influenced by a report sent to Washington by the 
American naval attache to France. After a tour of North 
Africa, the attache reported that France could only re-enter 
the war from its African colonies. The attache based his 
opinion on the presence of 125,000 French soldiers on active 
duty and another 200,000 in reserve in North Africa. 
Roosevelt transferred a State department official, Robert 
Murphy, from France to North Africa in order to contact and 
support anti-Nazi French military leaders. 65 
But Roosevelt's maneuvering was hidden from the public. 
The longer he continued relations with Vichy, the more the 
American public began to attack the policy. The American 
press fully reported the authoritarian and collaborationist 
character of the Vichy regime, but did not immediately 
63 Peter Tompkins, The Murder of Admiral Darlan: A Study 
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question continued relations. Criticism developed slowly, 
largely due to statements by American officials who spoke of 
Vichy's dangerous relationship with German. Secretary of 
the Navy Frank Knox delivered such a speech in New York on 
April 24, 1941: 
Too few of us realize, and still fewer 
acknowledge, the size of the disaster to American 
hemispheric safety if Germany, already the 
conqueror of France, should establish herself in 
Dakar, a French colonial possession. From there, 
with her surface ships, submarines and long-range 
bombers, a victorious Germany could substantially 
cut us off from all commerce with South America 
and make the Monroe Doctrine a scrap of paper. 66 
An anti-Vichy editorial appeared in the July 14, 1941 
edition of the New York Times. The editorial, titled 
"Bastille Day," recognized that July 14 was the French 
equivalent of the American July 4. Before the French 
Revolution, the French monarchy used the Bastille to 
imprison republican sympathizers, the paper said. The 
storming of the Bastille signified the French rejection of 
monarchy and the rise of democracy. However, the Times 
claimed that no French citizen would celebrate July 14, 
1941. The Nazis had established a new Bastille. 
This is a bastion that must be stormed and 
destroyed; a new emblem of tyranny that must 
disappear from France. The task is gigantic, but 
the French, remembering their past, will be equal 
to the future. While the Nazis occupy France, 
66Langer, 143-144. 
each day is Bastille Day for its people: a 
reminder of their tradition of liberty and a 
renewed call to action. 67 
An editorial titled "Encirclement" appeared in the 
Christian Science Monitor on August 11, 1941. The paper 
warned readers that Germany was positioned to topple the 
world's democracies. 
On the checkerboard of world war the Nazis are 
attacking at every available point. They know 
that their engagement with Russia is offering the 
democratic powers a golden opportunity to take the 
offensive. In this crisis they are trying to use 
Japan, Italy, and Vichy France to distract, 
confuse and hamper any strong British-American 
move ... Vichy is moving toward an active alliance 
which would give Berlin a military and naval 
advantage more than counterbalancing American 
occupation of Iceland. 68 
Only by giving the full measure of American support, 
"something stronger than words or ineffective economic 
pressures," to Britain to counter fascist threats could 
American democracy be secure, the paper claimed. 69 
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More anti-Vichy articles appeare~ in the August 27, 1941 
issue of the New York Post. The paper's main editorial, for 
instance, took the State Department to task for its 
"appeasement trade with Vichy-the reciprocal exchange of 
67
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goods with French North Africa which should have stopped 
short the moment Petain embraced the Axis ... For all the 
public knows, that suicide barter goes on." 70 
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In his "I'd Rather Be Right" column, nationally 
syndicated columnist Samuel Grafton discussed the measures 
that democracy needed to take in order to defend itself 
against fascism. He warned readers that fascist states had 
strongholds in the Western Hemisphere. 
A consciously democratic approach would have begun 
with the diagnosis that France had become Fascist. 
It would then have recalled that Germany had been 
Fascist for some years. It would have reached the 
same conclusion that, since both countries now 
belonged to the same system, democracy had nothing 
to hope from either. We ought then to have seized 
the French colonies at once, realizing that they 
had been transferred to Fascism the moment France 
went Fascist; that Herr Hitler did not need a deed 
to Martinique so long as he had a deed to 
Petain. 71 
The same edition saw a letter to the editor from the 
Clearing House for Youth Groups expressing the 
organization's preference for de Gaulle's Free French. The 
youth organization urged President Roosevelt to "help the 
world's fight against tyranny" by recognizing the Free 
French, providing Lend Lease aid to the Free French, and by 
"occupying Martinique and all French possessions in this 
70Samuel Grafton, "I'd Rather Be Right," The New York 
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hemisphere, to be held in trust for the people of France 
until their freedom has been rewon." 72 
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Given the disapproval of Vichy France and its 
collaborationist policies, as expressed in the media, it 
would seem only natural that this disapproval would extend 
to the individual members of the Vichy Government. The Four 
Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter dedicated the Allies to 
restoring democratic government and human rights to those 
living in fascist occupied territories. By definition, 
those who served fascist states and attempted to establish a 
political and social order that ran counter to the 
principles of the Atlantic Charter should be counted among 
the enemy. The American public clearly took this line of 
thinking in regard to Vichy officials. 
On February 13, 1941, Current History ran an article 
profiling the major personages in the Vichy government. The 
journal described Darlan as: 
10. 
A Navy man, an admiral, and therefore by training 
and tradition anti-British-the officers of the 
French Navy for generations have resented the 
superiority of British sea power. Jean Darlan is 
also ambitious. For both these reasons he is more 
likely to approve of "collaboration" with the 
Germans, though he is unquestionably a sincere 
patriot. 73 
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On May 26, 1941, Life magazine discussed Darlan's role in 
aligning Vichy France with Nazi Germany. Given the French 
government's actions, the magazine claimed, American foreign 
policy should favor the exiled, anti-Nazi Free French 
organization, headed by Gen. Charles de Gaulle: 
The French Vichy Government and Nazi Germany 
quietly reached an understanding which was very 
bad news indeed for the democracies. Following a 
50-minute conference with Hitler at Berchtesgaden, 
Admiral Fran~ois Darlan, French Vice Premier, 
agreed that France would here-after stand together 
with Germany on economic and apparently political 
matters .... This meant that France was betting on 
a Nazi victory. The only remaining Frenchmen whom 
the U.S. could now treat as friends were the Free 
French, fighting hard for the Allies under General 
Charles de Gaulle. 74 
Time magazine also associated Darlan with fascist 
policies in it May 26, 1941 issue by stating that when 
Darlan replaced Pierre Laval, the French arch-
collaborationist, as vice premier it was widely viewed as an 
anti-Nazi move. "But in Vice Premier Admiral Darlan the old 
Marshal picked a successor to Laval who has made himself 
superbly persona grata at Berchtesgaden and who is, in 
addition, much less unpopular in France than the scheming M. 
Laval. "75 
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By joining the Vichy government, Admiral Darlan became, 
in the view of the American public, a fascist by 
association, and therefore an enemy. Roosevelt had turned 
American public opinion in support of aiding the Allies 
through moral arguments. The Vichy government had been 
profiled as a collaborationist, hostile, fascist state by 
both the media and the United States government. After 
these developments it was impossible to reconcile 
negotiations with fascists with the stated purpose of the 
war. The groundwork had been laid for the public criticism 
that resulted from Eisenhower's negotiations with Admiral 
Darlan for a cease-fire during the North African campaign. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ROAD TO ALGERIA 
General Eisenhower arrived at Gibraltar on November 4, 
1942. He would later call it "the most dismal setting we 
occupied during the war." His quarters and office were 
little more than damp caves filled with stagnant air and lit 
by light bulbs that only partially illuminated the 
underground tunnels. Since the invasion force was still 
three days away from the landing sites, there was little for 
Eisenhower to do but wait. 76 
He had originally planned to move his base of operations 
from England to Gibraltar on Monday, November 2 but weather 
had prevented his leaving until Wednesday morning. To cover 
his absence in Britain, it was announced to the press that 
Eisenhower would be returning to Washington D.C. for 
conferences. Not even Eisenhower's wife, Marnie, knew that 
her husband was really preparing to lead an invasion force 
into North Africa; she was waiting for him in washington. 77 
To keep himself busy in the days before the Allied 
landings in North Africa, Eisenhower dictated letters and 
designed plans for the next phase of operations. His staff 
76S tephen E. Ambrose, The Supreme Commander: The war 
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and Company, Inc., 1970), 111. 
77 Ibid. 
prepared a message to be delivered by the French General 
Henri Giraud. The message stated that Giraud had entered 
into an alliance with the Allies and urged the French army 
not to resist the landings. The message would be sent by 
radio to Giraud on the British submarine Seraph; where he 
was to approve the message so that it could be dropped by 
airplane into North Africa. A British admiral proposed 
issuing all statements in Giraud's name since he was, 
effectively, in Allied hands. Eisenhower rejected the 
proposal. 78 
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Giraud had become important only one month before when 
Eisenhower's deputy commander, General Mark w. Clark, had 
secretly landed in North Africa. Robert Murphy, Roosevelt's 
consul in North Africa, had succeeded in arranging a meeting 
between pro-Allied French officers, led by General Charles 
E. Mast, and Allied representatives. Clark sought to assure 
the cooperation of underground French forces during the 
American invasion of French North Africa in November. 79 
Mast promised to organize the French underground in support 
of the Allied invasion, but Mast and Clark disagreed on who 
should lead the invasion force. 
Mast had told Murphy earlier that month that he favored 
French General Henri H. Giraud as commander of the Allied 
78 Ibid. , 112. 
79Tompkins, 43-47. 
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invasion force. Mast had opposed the idea of Giraud serving 
under Eisenhower and had proposed that Eisenhower retain 
command of the American forces while making Giraud Supreme 
Commander. Mast argued that with Giraud in command the 
Allies could take Algiers "practically without firing a 
shot. "80 
Giraud was favored so heavily by Mast because of his 
obvious anti-German credentials. Giraud had been taken as a 
prisoner of war by the Germans in both world wars 
successfully escaping both times. After his escape in the 
first world war, Giraud had dressed as a woman and a circus 
performer to hide from the Germans in Belgium. 81 Most 
recently he had escaped from Konigstein castle in April by 
weaving together several sections of wire-filled rope 
smuggled to him in cans of ham. 82 He again evaded the 
German secret police before finally escaping to Switzerland 
and then to France. After he arrived at Vichy on April 27, 
he prepared a report for Marshal Petain on the causes of the 
French defeat. Although Giraud blamed the defeat on moral 
grounds and favored an authoritarian regime, he continued to 
oppose Nazi Germany and he told Petain that Germany could 
not win the war. 83 Because of this background, Mast favored 
80Ambrose, 105. 
81Tompkins , 3 4 . 
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Giraud over all other possible French leaders, but it was 
already too late. 
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By the time Mast put Giraud's name forward as supreme 
commander, Roosevelt had already chosen Eisenhower to lead 
the invasion force, making Giraud little more than an Allied 
puppet. Clark kept this to himself and dodged Mast's 
proposal, saying only that the Allies wanted to turn North 
Africa over to the French as quickly as possible. Clark did 
state, however, that a simultaneous Allied landing in 
southern France, which Giraud demanded, would not happen. 
An invasion of France would only come after the Allies 
secured North Africa. 84 Mast accepted this reply and 
committed the North African French resistance to the 
American cause. As a result, when Giraud boarded the Seraph 
en route to Gibraltar, he thought he was about to take 
command of the invasion force. 
When Giraud arrived at Gibraltar on November 7, he 
immediately demanded to speak with Eisenhower. The French 
general walked into Eisenhower's cave and slapped a memo on 
his desk. In the memo, Giraud requested a radio 
transmitter, an airplane, some American staff officers, and 
facilities for a forward command post. Ignoring these 
demands, Eisenhower said he wanted Giraud to make a 
84Tompkins , 5 0 . 
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statement that would be broadcast to Morocco and Algeria. 85 
An argument ensued. Eisenhower would later report: 
Giraud initially refused to issue any statement 
for broadcast tonight, either from Gibraltar or 
from London or Washington. He insisted 
specifically that no radios should emanate from 
either national capital or from Allied 
Headquarters which would connect his name in any 
way with the operation in North Africa. Giraud 
flatly refused to participate in the operation in 
any other capacity than that of Supreme Commander. 
He insisted upon a position which would make him 
completely independent to carry out his own 
strategic and tactical conceptions .... 
Giraud is obsessed with the idea of an immediate 
move into France and implies that if he were made 
commander he would promptly use the entire air 
force coming into North Africa for the 
neutralization of Sardinia and to protect the 
transportation of troop into southern France; that 
he would transfer the fighter and bomber units 
thereafter to airfields in southern France. 86 
Eisenhower refused Giraud's proposals. This began six 
hours of discussions between Eisenhower and Giraud, during 
which Eisenhower repeatedly offered Giraud command of French 
forces in North Africa after the Allied forces had moved 
into Tunisia. Eisenhower even offered Giraud money to build 
an army and an air force. Giraud continued to refuse, 
demanding total command of the invasion force and at one 
point went so far as to say that, once he was made Supreme 
Commander, he would not be responsible to the Combined 
85Ambrose, 114. 
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Chiefs of Staff in Washington D.C. As far as Giraud was 
concerned, Eisenhower could deal with the ccs on supply 
matters while Giraud directed the war. Eisenhower may have 
been willing to concede some points, but he certainly would 
not give up the position of supreme commander. 87 Nor did 
Giraud's goals, arguments, plans, or demeanor suggest that 
he would have made a successful Allied commander. 
Even if he had wanted to, Eisenhower was in no position 
to surrender command of the Allied forces to any Frenchman. 
A great deal of planning and effort had gone into organizing 
the American-British invasion force. The whole campaign had 
been designed to coincide with a British advance from El 
Alamein, Egypt, upon German lines in Libya. Submitting to a 
commander who would drastica~ly alter the battle plan would 
upset a whole range of contingency plans. 88 
Giraud's position was just as easily understandable. He 
had long worked on plans for leading an uprising in southern 
France and it was hard for him to abandon them. 
Furthermore, a foreign power was about to invade French 
territory in his name, yet he was granted no actual power. 
He was being asked to fight against the legitimate French 
government by younger commanders with less experience. 
Faced with these prospects, Giraud felt he deserved the 
87Ambrose, 114-115. 
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position of Supreme Commander or, as he told Eisenhower at 
the end of their discussions, "Giraud will be a spectator in 
this affair." 89 
By the time the meeting between Eisenhower and Giraud 
ended, the first Allied forces were already going ashore. 
Reports reached Gibraltar that the surf along the Moroccan 
coast was low, allowing the American forces to go ashore. 
Soon afterwards came news that the landings at Oran had been 
unopposed, but there was still no reports from the forces 
which were landing in Algiers. Exhausted from the day's 
events, Eisenhower unfolded a cot in his office at 4:30 a.m. 
and went to sleep. He would be up again at 7:00 a.m. 90 
The final round of discussions with Giraud began at 10:00 
a.m. when the French general returned to Eisenhower's 
command center. The Allied staff gave Giraud an exaggerated 
report of the invasion's success; in truth, the Allied 
Headquarters still lacked accurate reports of the ground 
action. After hearing these reports he entered Eisenhower's 
office. Eisenhower opened the meeting by telling Giraud 
that he could not serve two masters, both the CCS and 
Giraud. Giraud claimed he understood Eisenhower's position 
and did not want command of the air and sea forces, but 
again asked for command of the land forces. Eisenhower 
89Ambrose, 115. 
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again refused but offered to consult Giraud on all major 
decisions. Giraud finally accepted Eisenhower's 
proposals. 91 
In essence, Giraud accepted the very proposals advanced 
by Eisenhower the previous day, as Eisenhower's report to 
the ccs shows: 
Giraud is recognized as the leader of the effort 
to prevent Axis aggression in North Africa, as the 
Commander-in-Chief of all French forces in the 
region and as governor of the French North African 
provinces. Eisenhower, as Commander-in-Chief of 
the Allied American-British forces, will co-
operate with Giraud to the fullest possible 
extent, and will work in closest collaboration 
with him. 
Giraud will leave Gibraltar tomorrow for North 
Africa, where he will do all in his power to stop 
all French resistance to the Allied forces and to 
begin the organization of French forces for use 
against the Axis. 92 
The North African Landings 
42 
In North Africa, the Allied forces met some resistance 
from French forces, although the degree of resistance varied 
greatly. The American and British forces landing at Oran 
and Algiers faced only light gunfire, but the American 
forces landing in Morocco met with aggressive French action. 
In large part this was due to the failure of the French 
conspirators to launch a successful pro-Allied uprising. 
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For example, in Morocco, one of the French generals 
aligned with Mast, General Jean Bethouart, arrested General 
Auguste Paul Nogues, the pro-Vichy Moroccan resident-
general, in his home at midnight on November 8. Bethouart 
then left to aid the Americans forces coming ashore and 
organize a rebellion against Vichy. Bethouart, however, had 
left Nogues alone in his home in Rabat. Nogues phoned 
Casablanca and ordered the head of the French naval forces 
to resist the All.ied landings. 93 
As a result, the Americans landing on the west coast 
faced heavy French resistance. Although the Americans 
gained a beachhead, they were unable to take Casablanca. 
The French battleship Jean Bart, docked in Casablanca 
harbor, opened fire upon American ships at sea. To protect 
the landing forces, American fighter planes had to bomb the 
Jean Bart, and other harbor defenses, and put the battleship 
out of commission. 94 
In Algiers, however, the French conspirators met with 
more success. On the night of November 7, armed groups of 
conspirators, dressed in the uniforms of Volotaires de Place 
{V.P}, spread out across the city. At 9 p.m., General Mast 
ordered every police station in the city to install these 
V.P. units for "the protection of public order" due to the 
93 Ibid. , 343. 
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possibility of an enemy landing. Every one of the stations 
complied, letting the rebels easily seize control of the 
police force. By 1:45 a.m., the rebels even had control of 
divisional headquarters. 95 
The rebel action seemed a great success. The Frenchmen 
sent to seize the Centrale Protegee had taken the main 
telephone switchboard. Soon afterwards the post office, 
Radio Alger, and the censors' listening station were taken. 
Perhaps most importantly, the army's General Staff 
Headquarters fell to the conspirators, who confined the 
troops stationed there to their barracks. By 2:35 a.m. 
Algiers was solidly in rebel hands. Armed conspirators had 
seized control of important city buildings and had arrested 
every major official capable of ordering resistance. 96 
While the rebels were seizing control of the city, the 
American consul in Algiers, Robert Murphy, went to the home 
of General Alphonse Juin, the commander of French land and 
air forces in North Africa. Juin, surprised at Murphy's 
arrival, greeted the American consul wearing his pajamas and 
dressing gown. 97 Murphy informed Juin that an American 
expeditionary force of 500,000 men was landing on the 
Algerian coastline. 98 
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The news caught Juin unprepared. "What! You mean the 
convoy we have seen in the Mediterranean is going to land 
here?" the general asked. When Murphy replied that it was 
Juin responded, "But you told me only a week ago that the 
United States would not attack us." Murphy told Juin that 
the American forces were landing at French invitation and 
intended to work with the French toward the liberation of 
France. 99 "We hope for your cooperation, General, and the 
cooperation of the French forces here against the common 
enemy," Murphy told the French general. "German troops 
occupy the greater part of France. Only through our victory 
can France be free. 11100 
"Were I the responsible commander here, I would accept 
your offer," Juin said. However, Admiral Darlan, Juin's 
superior, had arrived in Algiers from France that very week. 
Since Darlan could override any decision Juin made, the 
French general felt it necessary to consult the Admiral. 
Murphy agreed. 101 
Darlan had arrived in Algiers on November 5 after 
receiving news from Admiral Raymond Fenard that Darlan's 
son, Alain, was close to death. Alain had been struck with 
polio while working as a traveling salesman in Tunisia. 
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Although Alain's doctors told Darlan that his son's health 
had improved, the admiral insisted on staying in North 
Africa until November 10. 102 
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Darlan had already approached the Americans about joining 
the Allied cause. He knew of the coming invasion and may 
have placed himself in North Africa for that very reason. 
It is clear that many high-ranking Vichy officials knew of 
the Allied plans in the weeks before the invasion. The same 
day that Murphy told Mast when the invasion would occur, one 
of the French North African conspirators cabled Darlan in 
Vichy. The cable said simply, "Date advanced. Landings 
imminent." Darlan's staff forwarded this message to Marshal 
Petain. One French general, Jean Marie Bergeret, urged the 
marshal to go to North Africa and take command. The general 
argued that an Allied invasion would place the French North 
African commanders in an ambiguous situation. Petain 
replied that one could not defend France by quitting it and 
he did not want "to abandon forty million Frenchmen. 11103 
On November 6, word reached Vichy that Allied convoys had 
gathered at Gibraltar. General Bergeret immediately flew to 
North Africa and informed Darlan, at Alain's bedside, that 
the Allies planned to invade French North Africa. Darlan 
ignored the warning and claimed the convoys were headed for 
102Tompkins, 6 5 . 
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Malta. After leaving Darlan, Bergeret visited Darlan's 
Algerian host, Admiral Fenard. Bergeret soon discovered 
that Fenard, who called Darlan to Algiers, also knew about 
the American landings. 104 
The evidence suggests that Darlan came to North Africa 
knowing full well the date of the Allied landings and that 
his son's health provided an excuse to leave France for 
Algiers. 
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Whatever brought Darlan to Algiers, Murphy had to deal 
with him. General Juin phoned Darlan's villa and informed 
Mme. Darlan that Murphy had an urgent message to deliver. 105 
Murphy did not wait for the admiral long; Darlan arrived 
within twenty minutes. Murphy immediately told Darlan of 
the American landings. 106 If Darlan had known of the Allied 
operation before he had come to North Africa, he now seemed 
genuinely surprised. "I have known for a long time that the 
British were stupid, but I always believed that the 
Americans were more intelligent. I begin to believe that 
you make as many mistakes as they do, " Darlan said. 107 
Murphy spent the next 15 minutes arguing with Darlan. 
Murphy tried every argument he could think of to induce 
Darlan to join the Americans, to persuade him to "seize this 
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golden opportunity." But Darlan refused to believe the 
invasion was little more than a raid. He claimed that if 
the raid failed, the Germans would then invade North Africa, 
which would make matters that much worse for France. Darlan 
asked Juin to send his chief of staff to contact the navy to 
ascertain the size of the invasion. 100 
When Juin's chief of staff tried to leave he found the 
house surrounded by young men armed with rifles. The leader 
of the armed group claimed that only Murphy could leave the 
house. 109 At this point, Juin and Darlan considered 
themselves prisoners. Murphy claimed that he had not 
planned to draw Darlan into a trap and offered to send a 
vice-consul, Harvey Pendar, "to find out who had placed the 
watchdogs and have them called off." 110 
While Pendar went to find someone with enough authority 
to remove the guards, Murphy became involved in a political 
discussion with Juin and Darlan. They claimed that Murphy 
had misled them about the date of the American landings, 
that the Americans had come as allies, and that the 
Americans had come in the name of Giraud, a man with no 
legal authority. "He is not your man," Darlan said. 
100Tompkins, 83. 
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"Politically he is a child. He's a good divisional 
commander, nothing more." 111 
Pendar returned to the house unable to find anyone who 
could order the guards away, but he brought back Admiral 
Fen.ard. Earlier in the evening, a French conspirator 
informed Fenard of the Algiers uprising and the admiral 
joined in at once. After meeting Pendar, Fenard agreed to 
try and convince Darlan to order a surrender. 112 
With Fenard present, Murphy tried a different approach. 
49 
He argued that in July 1941 Darlan had told Admiral William 
Leahy, the U.S. ambassador to Vichy France, that the admiral 
would make himself available if the U.S. ever sent 500,000 
soldiers and several thousand tanks and planes to 
Marseilles. "That moment has now arrived," Murphy said, 
"and it is your responsibility that no French blood will be 
shed incident to the massive landing of American forces 
which is now about to take place in French North Africa." 113 
Darlan was not prepared to go so far. He told Murphy 
that he had spent two years advocating obedience to Marshal 
Petain. "I cannot now deny my oath," he explained. Murphy 
proposed that Darlan contact Petain and ask for 
instructions. Darlan immediately drafted a message to Vichy 
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informing Petain of the American landings and asking the 
marshal for freedom of action. 114 
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After Darlan had finished writing the message, Fenard 
asked Pendar to deliver it to the Admiralty. Instead of 
delivering the message, Pendar drove to the pro-Allied rebel 
headquarters and steamed the envelope open. The message 
read: 
Admiral Darlan to Marshal Petain: I was summoned 
at 0115 this morning by General Juin and found 
with him Mr. Murphy who declared to me that on the 
demand of a Frenchman, General Giraud, President 
Roosevelt had decided to occupy French North 
Africa with important forces this very morning, to 
save France which they wished to maintain in its 
integrity. 
I answered that France had signed an armistice 
convention and that I could but comply with the 
orders of the Marshal to defend its territories. 115 
After reading the message, the French rebels refused to 
send the cable. One of the rebel leaders told Pendar, "Tell 
Bob [Murphy] we cannot possibly forward this cable. It is 
not a matter of courtesy. It is giving the enemy a 
weapon. "116 
Pendar returned to Juin's house and found Murphy pacing 
in the gardens. Pendar quickly told Murphy the contents of 
Darlan's message, but Murphy wanted to know the location of 
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the American forces. While at rebel headquarters, Pendar 
heard a rumor that the Americans had landed at Cap Matifou. 
"What the devil are they doing out there, 30 miles from the 
city?" Murphy roared. 
About this same time, one of the French rebel leaders, 
Jean Rigault, arrived to talk to Murphy. Rigault worried 
that the American troops might not arrive in time to support 
the rebel uprising. "I only guaranteed our operation for 
this one night," he said. "Your friends were supposed to be 
here at 2 a.m. Now they are three hours late. At 7 o'clock 
it will be daylight. I cannot answer for what will happen 
after that. "117 
The Americans had, in fact, landed fifteen miles east and 
west of Algiers. It took hours for the Allied troops to 
reach the city from their landing positions. 118 The American 
advance toward Algiers took longer than expected because 
French and Arab speaking soldiers were not included in every 
detachment. 119 
As long as the French rebels held the city, the Americans 
could enter Algiers from either the east or west without 
meeting resistance. Resistance could only occur if the 
Allies tried to enter the harbor, where the Vichy Admiralty 
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building in French North Africa was located. 120 
Unfortunately, this was precisely what happened. 
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Less than an hour before Murphy and Rigault met, two 
British destroyers-the H.M.S Broke and the H.M.S. 
Malcolm-attempted to sail through the harbor and land troops 
on the Quai de Dieppe. 121 As the two destroyers entered the 
harbor, they appeared on the French Admiralty's radar. The 
city lights went out and search lights began to sweep the 
harbor. 122 
A spotlight fell on one of the destroyers and the naval 
shore batteries opened fire. Until this time, most Vichy 
officers did not know that pro-Allied French rebels had 
taken control of the city, but the sound of cannon fire 
changed all that. With the start of the bombardment, Vichy 
officers began to report to their stations, but the rebels 
quickly took them into custody. This presented problems for 
the conspirators; they only numbered 400 men and could not 
guard a 12, 000-man garrison with a 30, 000-man reserve. 123 
Near 6:30 a.m., Admiral Fenard emerged from Juin's house 
with another message for Petain. He approached Murphy and 
Pendar and asked about the first message. Pendar said he 
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had given it to others for transmission. Then he took the 
second message. 124 
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Before Pendar left to send the second message, Murphy 
asked him to also send a message to the Allied commander. 
Murphy still worried about the absence of American soldiers. 
The message, directed to the Eastern Task Force Commander, 
read: "It is urgently necessary that some Allied troops 
arrive in the city of Algiers as quickly as possible. 
Situation well in hand but unwise to let this endure too 
long. ,,12s 
As Pendar drove toward the house gates, 50 pro-Vichy 
forces arrived at Juin's residence. Armed with machine 
guns, these forces, called Gardes Mobiles, quickly chased 
away the poorly armed group of rebels. 126 They immediately 
placed Murphy under arrest and dragged Pendar from the car. 
The two diplomats stood with their hands above their heads 
while they were searched and their papers seized. 127 Darlan 
and Juin soon left for Fort l' Empereur, where they could 
organize the city's defense, but said they would talk with 
Murphy after they had more information about the American 
landings. 128 
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Shortly after Darlan arrived at Fort l' Ernpereur to order 
resistance to the American landings, across town another 
group of Frenchmen planned the continuation of the rebel 
uprising. The Frenchmen at the rebel headquarters anxiously 
awaited the arrival of General Giraud. They had expected 
Giraud to land at the Elida airfield, southwest of Algiers, 
sometime after 6:30 a.m., but as time went on, it became 
clear that he was not coming. Even if he did arrive, it 
would take the general an hour to reach Algiers from Elida 
and the situation was rapidly deteriorating. Gardes Mobiles 
and other loyal Vichy troops, now alerted to the rebel 
plans, were taking back city offices. 129 
After some discussion, the rebels decided to broadcast an 
appeal from Giraud to the Algerian public. "It may rally 
the people and save the day before we are overwhelmed by the 
mi 1 i tary, " one of the rebe 1 1 eader s argued. 13 0 Two 
conspirators immediately left rebel headquarters for a radio 
station still in rebel hands. Impersonating Giraud's voice, 
one of the conspirators read the appeal, hastily written at 
rebel headquarters, over Algiers radio. 131 The rebel 
impersonator claimed that he [Giraud] had arrived to assume 
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command of all French forces in North Africa and then urged 
the populace to support the American troops. 
For the last two years you have scrupulously kept 
the terms of the armistice in spite of the 
repeated violations of our enemies. Today Germany 
and Italy want to occupy North Africa. America 
forestalls them and assures us of her loyal and 
disinterested support. This is our chance to 
revival. We cannot neglect this unexpected 
opportunity of recovery. 
I take up my action station among you. I ask for 
your confidence. You have mine. We have one 
passion-France; and one aim-victory. Remember 
that the African army holds in its hands the fate 
of France. 132 
When American and British newspapers began reporting the 
African landings the next day, they would focus on the false 
Giraud announcement. In Giraud, the American press saw a 
crusading soldier fighting to restore democracy to a captive 
France. In a November 9 profile of Giraud, the Washington 
Post referred to the French general as a "legendary figure" 
and noted he did not have a command under "Pierre Laval's 
Nazi-cherishing regime" which gave him some popularity in 
the French resistance. 133 
The London Times also praised General Giraud in its 
November 9 editorial "Allied Assurances." The British 
newspaper told its readers that Vichy officials would 
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distort the purpose of the American invasion, "but it is not 
to them that Frenchmen can look for deliverance ... The 
voice of the true France was heard in the ringing words of 
General Giraud yesterday morning and in those of General De 
Gaulle last night." 134 
over the next several days, other newspapers published 
articles praising Giraud. On November 10, the New York 
Times acknowledged the French general's involvement in the 
editorial "The Mediterranean Front." The Times told readers 
that Giraud's support of the North African operation was 
"news of first importance." Giraud, having fought in North 
Africa before the war, could give the Allies important 
information about the territory they were operating in. "He 
commands enormous prestige in the French Army and his 
assumption of leadership of the Free French movement in 
North Africa cannot fail to aid our cause enormously." 135 
The Baltimore Sun also recognized Giraud in its Nov. 12 
editorial, "Opportunity Knocks Again For France In Africa." 
The Sun argued that the American landings in North Africa 
provided the perfect opportunity for the French to abandon 
their neutrality and resume the war against the Germans and 
Italians. Noting that the French Government in 1940 did not 
134
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continue the war from its colonies because it felt that 
Britain would also soon surrender, the Sun said this belief 
had been proved wrong. The U.S. could supply the arms to 
Frenchmen interested in using the colonies as a base of 
operations against the Axis. Moreover, the German 
occupation of all of France violated the terms of the 
armistice, which separated France into German and Vichy 
administered areas. This should, the paper said, change the 
minds of Frenchmen, like Petain, who opposed renewing the 
war. 136 
The great question is whether those who speak for 
France in North Africa will join General Giraud 
and others in taking full advantage of the 
opportunity that presents itself. If they do, 
there will be more reason than ever to hope that 
the rigors of the extended occupation of 
metropolitan France will be of more limited 
duration. 137 
Walter Lippmann, a long-standing critic of the American 
French policy, gave some measure of support to Giraud in his 
November 12 column. Since the Allied invasion had destroyed 
Vichy in North Africa, Lippmann argued, the German invasion 
of unoccupied France had destroyed Vichy in Europe and a 
power vacuum had been created. The creation of a French 
provisional government was needed, not only for the Allies 
136
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to negotiate with, but also to organize armies, levy taxes, 
and mobilize French resources: 138 
It [the political void] can be filled only by 
leaders like General de Gaulle and General Giraud 
who are at once French and free and fighting. 
Surely it must be the immediate object of our 
policy of place at their disposal all the 
necessary facilities for prompt agreement on 
effective working arrangements. We must then hope 
and pray with all earnestness that no other 
consideration will enter their minds, or that of 
their colleagues, except to seize the glorious 
opportunity, which is now theirs, of mobilizing 
France for its fullest practical participation in 
the war. 139 
Aside from building up General Giraud's military and 
strategic knowledge, these newspapers point out that Giraud 
has no association with Vichy. In fact, media praised 
Giraud precisely because he didn't carry the taint of Vichy 
evil. The British press had condemned the Vichy government 
for taking France out of the war and leaving Britain alone. 
In America, the press attacked the U.S. government's 
continued relations with Vichy because it was a fascist-
leaning, authoritarian government. 
The media's praise for Giraud only reinforced the 
public's attitude that World war II was a moral crusade 
between democracy and totalitarianism. By not aligning with 
Vichy, Giraud seemed to represent the French ideals of 
138Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The 
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liberty, equality and fraternity as opposed to Vichy 
collaboration. Each of the newspaper articles mentioning 
Giraud favorably contrasted him with Petain, Laval, or other 
Vichy officials, or associated him (incorrectly) with de 
Gaulle and the Free French movement. 
Indeed, during the same time frame that the British and 
American media welcomed Giraud, they also welcomed the 
passing of the Vichy system. on November 9, the New York 
Times stated that the American landings would inspire the 
French people to overthrow the fascist Vichy Government. 
Although the "renegade" Laval and the "befuddled" Petain may 
confuse the French public and drive Frenchmen into joining 
the Axis, "any such success for the betrayers of France will 
be of short duration ... the French people will hear and 
answer the summons of de Gaulle, the real leader of France 
in this hour of crisis. 11140 
As further evidence of this public attitude, the Times 
made a careful distinction between the Vichy Government and 
the French people the very next day. 141 
We are not at war with France. We are at war for 
France. war with Pierre Laval or with any one who 
obeys his orders, or with the man in Berlin from 
whom he takes his orders, is not war with France .... 
140
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To all true Frenchmen, to that vast suffering, 
betrayed majority of occupied and unoccupied 
France alike, we hold out are hands as friends and 
comrades. 
We hope to march with them, not against them, and 
to see their flag carried with our own when the 
troops of the United Nations parade in final 
victory. In the light of that hope we fight in 
Africa and we dismiss an Ambassador whose 
instructions, whether or not he wished them so, 
came to him, via Vichy, from Berlin. 142 
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However much British and American public opinion 
disapproved of Vichy, on the morning of November 8 it was 
still very much a force for the Allies to reckon with. In 
Algiers, Murphy and Pendar were Vichy prisoners, but Pendar 
still had Darlan's second message to Petain. Admiral Fenard 
arranged to have Pendar deliver Darlan's second message to 
Petain to the Admiralty. After the Admiralty's commanding 
officer confirmed that the message had originated from 
Darlan, it was forwarded to Petain. 143 By 9 a.m., Darlan 
received Petain's reply. "I have received your message via 
the Admiralty," Marshal Petain said. "I am happy that you 
are there. You may act and inform me. You know you have my 
full confidence." 144 
By the time Darlan received Petain's message, Vichy 
troops had reestablished control in Algiers. The Garde 
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Mobile had scattered the French rebels and taken back key 
city buildings, but Darlan knew American troops waited just 
outside the city. In another message to Petain sent shortly 
before noon, Darlan said the city could fall to the Allies 
by nightfall. 145 
At 4:30 p.m., Juin learned that the Americans were near 
the city. He could either abandon the city, leaving Darlan 
to deal with the political situation, or stay and be 
surrounded. Darlan phoned to ask Juin to stay in the city 
and negotiate a cease-fire for Algiers. "There is no point 
having people killed uselessly," Darlan said. "Let us not 
prolong a resistance which is hopeless." Juin now ordered 
all French forces to withdraw toward Fort l' Empereur in 
order to avoid conflict with the American troops entering 
the city. 146 Juin then called Murphy and asked him to 
contact the American commander, General Charles Ryder, to 
tell him that the French were prepared to surrender the 
city. 147 
The surrender of North Africa 
Eisenhower sent Gen. Mark Clark to Algiers the next day, 
November 9, 1942. Having learned of Darlan's presence in 
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Algiers shortly after 9:00 a.m., Eisenhower told Clark to 
come to terms with Darlan. If the French admiral was 
willing to cooperate, the North African campaign would 
become infinitely easier. Roosevelt and Churchill had 
essentially sent Eisenhower to North Africa with a small, 
untrained army. It would be difficult for the Allied forces 
to fight both the French and the Axis forces. If the 
Spanish decided to intervene in North Africa on the Axis 
side, then the Allied operation would be over. 
In order to offset these military disadvantages, and to 
save lives, Eisenhower was prepared to take advantage of the 
opportunity Darlan presented. Darlan held an established 
position in the Vichy government, as commander in chief of 
the French armed forces, and could legally order French 
soldiers to join the Allies. Any soldier following a 
similar order from Giraud, who had no such authority, would 
be committing mutiny. 148 
General Ryder first met Darlan at the admiral's 
headquarters, at the Hotel Saint-Georges, at 8 p.m. on 
November 8. Juin, Fenard and various other French officers 
also arrived for the meeting. The American contingent, 
however, arrived late. Murphy first had a long meeting with 
the French resistance leaders. The conspirators had placed 
all their hopes on Giraud, who had still not arrived, but 
148Ambrose, 120. 
now the Americans were negotiating with Darlan. Moreover, 
many of the French rebels were now in jail or feared 
retribution. 149 Murphy had to deal with these issues and 
discuss what actions the conspirators should take next. 
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As a result, Murphy and Ryder did not arrive at the Hotel 
Saint-Georges until 10 p.m., but the parties wasted no time. 
Ryder immediately suggested that Darlan extend the cease-
fire to all of North Africa, but the admiral hesitated, 
saying he needed to consult Petain before making commitments 
outside of Algiers. Ryder also claimed that he could not 
speak without first consulting General Clark. Ryder wanted 
to settle the Algerian situation and move his men into 
Tunisia, leaving Algiers under French administration. 
"Under what government?" Darlan asked. Ryder replied that 
he expected to find an insurrectionary, anti-Vichy 
government but further developments had to wait until the 
arrival of General Clark. 150 And so November 8 closed 
without any real progress toward a total surrender of French 
North Africa. 
Despite the lack of a firm cease-fire agreement, the 
Allied press treated the opening of the North African front 
positively. For the Americans, nearly a year had passed 
between the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, and the 
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subsequent U.S. entrance into the war, and the beginning of 
any significant campaign against the Germans and Italians. 
While the media did not pretend that the North African 
landings represented the opening of a major front against 
the Axis, they did recognize it as an important first step 
toward Allied landings in Europe. The Allied media also 
recognized how the Africa landings reassured an anxious 
world about the American and English commitment to the war. 
The language the media used to frame this campaign 
illustrates how deeply the public had come to perceive World 
war II as a moral conflict. 
The Washington Post in its November 9 editorial "The Hour 
Has Struck" graphically comments on the fighting in French 
North Africa. "At last the hour has arrived for the stroke 
of the moment against the monstrous tyranny which has set 
the entire world in flames," the Post wrote. "The fear had 
been growing that the hour would never come. "151 
The Post told its readers that the landings in North 
Africa represented the first time that viewers can discern a 
coordinated effort by the Allies to fight the Axis. Until 
this point, the paper claims, it appeared as if the United 
Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union were 
fighting isolated, defensive wars. But the African campaign 
illustrated the efforts of the "grand alliance" to attack 
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the Axis on one front in order to aid an ally on another 
front. 152 
The timing is perfect. As Stalin said on Friday, 
Hitler's time schedule has been thrown completely 
out of kilter. That schedule-revised after the 
failure to capture Moscow last year-called weeks 
ago for the annihilation of the Red Army. But the 
Red Army is still intact. It is not only intact: 
it is also strong enough at any time to go on a 
counter-offensive in concert with the Allied plan 
in Africa. 153 
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The New York Times offered a similar evaluation in its 
November 9 editorial "The Great Offensive." The Times tells 
readers that history will record November 7 as the beginning 
of the Allied offensive against the Axis powers. Despite 
the dangers the North African landings may bring, "we know 
now that we are no longer merely hitting back on the 
defensive." Moreover, the paper says, the North African 
campaign proves three things: that America is prepared to 
sacrifice its own for an Allied victory, is strong enough to 
fight two fronts at once (in Europe and in the Pacific), and 
has enough men stationed in Europe to open a major 
offensive. 154 
The impact of these moral factors will reach far 
and wide. From this demonstration of our power 
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and our purpose the conquered peoples of Europe, 
impatient for the day when they can turn with fury 
on the Nazi beast, will draw fresh strength and 
courage. Our Russian allies, fighting superbly, 
and for the most part alone, through so many 
months, will see in the arc that reaches from 
North Africa to Southern Europe the shape of the 
Second Front which they have urged us to 
establish. The few still hesitant and still 
skeptical nations in our own hemisphere will find 
fresh evidence of the strength of our commitment 
to destro_x the military power of Hitler's 
Germany. 1 
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In London, predictably, the African landings were also 
warmly welcomed. Not only did capturing French North Africa 
give the Allies access to the Mediterranean, shorting supply 
routes to posts throughout the British Empire, but it also 
placed the German Africa Corps between two Allied armies. 
The American army in West Africa and the British army in 
Egypt, the London Times tells readers, now opens the 
prospect of total defeat of the German forces in Africa: 
The prospect is now opening of establishing allied 
power along the whole coast of North Africa, so as 
to confront, across a comparatively narrow sea, 
all the southern shores of enslaved Europe, and 
threaten by many possible routes the ultimate 
blows at the heart of Germany. 156 
In the Soviet Union, it was reported that the news of the 
North African landings provided a moral boost for Red Army 
troops. Several days after the landings, Stalin wrote to an 
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A.P. correspondent and expressed his pleasure with the North 
African campaign: 157 
The African campaign refutes again the skeptics 
who affirm that the Anglo-American leaders cannot 
organize a serious war campaign. No one but first 
rate organizers could carry on such serious war 
operations as the successful landings in North 
Africa across the ocean, as the quick occupation 
of harbors and wide territories and as smashing of 
the Italo-German armies being effected so 
masterfully. 158 
While the media was busy congratulating the American 
forces in Africa, negotiations for a cease-fire in French 
North Africa continued in Algiers. Ryder resumed 
discussions with Darlan at 5:30 p.m. on November 9. The 
meeting had been scheduled for earlier in the day, but 
Ryder, hoping that General Clark would arrive, kept 
postponing the meeting. Finally Ryder decided he could wait 
no longer and returned to the Hotel Saint-Georges. 159 
Once at Darlan's headquarters, Ryder presented the 
admiral with two armistice agreements. One was lenient, 
while the other called for disarming the French soldiers and 
confining them to barracks. Juin, who was also in 
attendance, argued that French soldiers would need their 
157Alexander Werth, Russia at war, 1941-1945 {New York: 
Dutton, 1964), 491. 
158Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The war 
They Waged and the Peace They Sought {Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1957), 96. 
159Tompkins, 113. 
68 
weapons in order to defend themselves against the Germans. 
One French general offered to confine his troops to quarters 
if Ryder allowed the soldiers to keep their weapons. Darlan 
liked the suggestion and added that all munitions, except 
those needed "for the maintenance of order," be placed under 
American guard. 160 
This seemed to indicate that some progress was being 
made, but Ryder needed Darlan to commit to a cease-fire in 
all of North Africa. To force the issue, Ryder proposed 
letting French ships fly their own flag and retaining the 
regular North African administration. Darlan immediately 
asked if the U.S. was prepared to recognize Vichy authority 
in North Africa. Again, Ryder said he could not answer 
without consulting General Clark. 161 
Luckily, during Ryder's meeting with Darlan, Clark 
finally landed in North Africa. Upon arrival, the general 
immediately went to the Hotel Saint-Georges, arriving only 
an hour after the conference had begun. 162 
Clark tried to get a cease-fire by claiming that 150,000 
Allied troops were ashore. Actually, only 3,400 soldiers 
had landed by this time. 163 In any case, Darlan and Juin 
would not submit and complained that the landings had taken 
160 Ibid. , 114. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid. 
69 
them by surprise. Darlan also stated that had the Americans 
waited two weeks, a Vichy proposal securing French 
cooperation in a similar operation would have been 
advanced. 164 
Since Clark felt that no serious options had been 
advanced he broke off discussions for the evening, proposing 
another session in the morning. The Americans did not take 
the manila envelope containing the harsher of the two 
armistice agreements with them. After studying it, Darlan 
asked the opinion of the assembled officers. The staff told 
the admiral that French resistance was futile and urged him 
to accept the lenient terms. At 8:30 p.m., Darlan sent a 
cable to Petain notifying the Marshal of the situation. 
Negotiations between Clark and Darlan resumed at 10:00 
a.m. the next morning. As Darlan pretended to review the 
armistice terms (which he already knew), Murphy said, "Time 
is pressing, General Clark intends to settle the political 
question. Are you ready, Admiral, to have hostilities cease 
in North Africa?" Darlan explained that he had sent 
messages to Petain and would have to wait for instructions. 
This angered Clark who told Darlan, through an interpreter: 
Tell him that Petain is nothing in our young 
lives. He has today broken relations with the 
united States and declared this landing as an act 
hostile to France. He ordered resistance. As far 
164Langer, 3 5 2 . 
as we're concerned, we don't recognize any 
authority of Petain in North Africa. 165 
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But Darlan still refused to sign an armistice. The 
admiral offered to send another message to Vichy but Murphy 
demanded a settlement in 30 minutes. Clark threatened to 
have Giraud sign the armistice. "Do you want Giraud without 
the Army or the Army without Giraud?" Darlan asked. Juin 
explained that Giraud had no power or influence in North 
Africa; the French generals still organizing resistance in 
Morocco and Tunisia would not follow Giraud. "In that 
case," Murphy told Darlan, "General Clark is going to find 
it necessary to take you under his protection. "166 
Clark rose to end the meeting but Juin begged for five 
minutes alone with Darlan. Clark agreed and the American 
delegation left the room. Eight minutes later Fenard 
emerged from the room to announce that Darlan had agreed to 
surrender North Africa. The Americans re-entered the room 
and found Darlan writing a message ordering the various 
French military chiefs in North Africa to end hostilities 
with the Americans. 167 Darlan told Clark: 
In the name of the marshal, I [Darlan] assume 
authority in North Africa. The present military 
chiefs retain their commands and the political 
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structure and administration remain intact. No 
chanies may be effected until further orders from 
me.16 
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Darlan notified Vichy of his decision at once. Petain 
initially approved of Darlan's actions, but the Germans had 
intercepted Darlan's telegram and intended to force Petain 
to repudiate Darlan. The Vichy Premier, Pierre Laval, was 
in Germany to meet with Hitler when the Allied invasion of 
North Africa occurred. When shown the telegram, Laval 
immediately called Petain and threatened to resign if Petain 
supported Darlan. Fearing German reprisal, Petain 
disavowed Darlan on the grounds he was a prisoner and named 
General Auguste Paul Nogues, the resident-general in 
Morocco, commander-in-chief of North Africa. At the same 
time, Petain sent a second message to Darlan through secret 
channels. This message expressed the marshal's approval of 
Darlan' s actions. 169 
The news of Darlan's removal from office was made public 
before Petain's secret message arrived. Clark returned to 
the Hotel Saint-Georges to ensure Darlan's continued 
cooperation. But Darlan claimed he would have to cancel the 
armistice. 17° Clark threatened to arrest Darlan and his 
staff but Darlan still would not commit. Luckily, Darlan 
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received Petain's secret message and decided to let the 
cease-fire stand. 171 
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The events of the next day, November 11, seemed to remove 
any doubts from Darlan's mind. Hitler ordered the German 
armies to march into unoccupied France. By that afternoon, 
Darlan released a statement claiming that the Germans had 
broken the armistice and had taken Petain prisoner. 172 Since 
Darlan was "faithful to the marshal's inner thoughts, "173 he 
would assume the powers of government in Petain's name. 
Darlan reaffirmed the cease-fire orders and urged the French 
officials in Tunisia to resist German landings (the Axis had 
begun sending men and materials to Tunisia as early as 
November 9 ) . 174 
Nogues arrived from Morocco in the afternoon of the 
following day, November 12, and proceeded to Fenard's villa, 
where Darlan still resided. Seeing that Darlan was free to 
act on his own, Nogues restored full command to the admiral. 
At 6:00 p.m., Darlan, Nogues, and the other French 
principals again met Clark at the Hotel Saint-Georges. 
While Nogues expressed his relief that the fighting was 
over, he only wanted to grant the Americans the right of 
passage through Morocco. The general wanted to send an 
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emissary back to Vichy to determine if the marshal wished 
the North African army to join the Allied cause. "Please 
impress it upon General Nogues, once and for all," Clark 
said to Pendar, who was acting as interpreter, "that there 
can be no question of communicating with Vichy. We have 
broken relations with that government. In our eyes it no 
longer exists." 175 
Nogues turned to leave, but Darlan held him in place. 
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Darlan requested a private meeting between himself, Nogues 
and Clark. Once alone, Nogues insisted that Giraud be left 
out of any further arrangements. "There was a General 
Giraud," Nogues said. "There is no more." Clark, 
increasing exasperated by the changing French attitude, read 
an ultimatum from Eisenhower. If the French did not come 
quickly to terms, the Americans would either put Giraud in 
full command of North Africa or rule by military decree. 176 
Clark then demanded to reread the ultimatum with Giraud 
present. When Giraud entered the room with his hand out, 
Nogues placed his behind his back and said, "I will not 
speak to a rebel general." Unwittingly, he then said, "Bon 
jour, 11 and then muttered "traitre. 11 At this point, Juin 
spoke up, "Assez de votre sale politique. We are going to 
fight the Germans." Nogues then agreed to go halfway toward 
175Tompkins, 127. 
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meeting the American demands. While still claiming the 
French couldn't join the Allied cause without some period of 
neutrality first, he suggested that Giraud lead a volunteer 
corps to fight with the Allies. Again the French argued, 
but Clark decided to end it. Clark promised to recognize 
Darlan as the chief political official over North Africa and 
Nogues as the chief political official in Morocco. 177 
The leaders of the North African rebels-Jacques Lemaigre-
Dubreuil, Jacques Saint-Hardouin, and Jean Rigault-arrived 
at Murphy's office early on Friday, November 13. They 
argued that the Americans had disregarded their previous 
promises to Giraud in favor of making a deal with Darlan. 
They demanded that Giraud become commander of the armed 
forces to balance Darlan's political power. Murphy took the 
group to see Clark, who claimed he had no objection to their 
proposal. But after his struggle to get the French to agree 
to the current terms, Clark said the French needed to work 
the matter out among themselves. Moreover, because 
Eisenhower was on his way to Algiers, the matter had to be 
decided that morning. 178 
The French rebel leaders went to the Hotel Saint-Georges 
in one last attempt to bring the various factions together. 
Once there, they encountered not only General Giraud, but 
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General Nogues and General Juin. Dubreuil quickly asked 
Juin to soothe the waters. "Come, come, mon general," Juin 
said to Nogues, "we can't abandon a five-star comrade with 
such a tiny command. It's a question of France. Let us all 
march together. I am ready to place myself at Giraud's 
orders . "179 
By now Nogues not only had time to calm down, but had 
seen Petain's secret messages to Darlan expressing the 
marshal's approval of the admiral's actions. Nogues said he 
would support handing Giraud command of the army if three 
conditions were met: that de Gaulle never set foot in North 
Africa, that Giraud recognize Darlan's authority, and that 
Giraud hold his command in Petain's name. Giraud agreed. A 
messenger hurried to Clark and told him, "Everything is set. 
They all agree. Giraud has given up his corps of volunteers 
and assumes command of the Army. France is no longer 
neutral. She is with the Allies." Clark happily drove out 
to the Maison Blanche airport to meet Eisenhower. He could 
tell his commander that he had succeeded in his mission; he 
had secured French cooperation. 180 
After lunch, Clark took Eisenhower to the Hotel Saint-
Georges where the commander-in-chief discussed the current 
military and political situation with Clark and his staff. 
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Murphy arrived with a copy of the Clark-Darlan agreement 
after the meeting had begun. In effect, the agreement gave 
the Allies control of airports, harbors, port defenses and 
fortifications. The agreement also gave the Allies broad 
emergency powers in case of social breakdown and disorder. 
In return, the Americans recognized the current political 
structure and promised to supply food to the North African 
colonies. 181 
Eisenhower could have vetoed the agreement. By this 
time, Allied troops occupied key positions in French North 
Africa and many competent Gaullists in England could have 
administered the colonies. But Murphy claimed that only 
Darlan and the Vichyities could ensure order in the French 
colonies. In addition, Darlan seemed most likely to bring 
the port of Dakar in French west Africa over to the Allied 
side. Most importantly, Eisenhower needed to move into 
Tunisia to deal with the massing Axis troops and Rommel's 
Afrika Korps. He couldn't afford to leave troops behind to 
secure the rear. 182 
Eisenhower asked Murphy for advice but the diplomat now 
seemed reluctant to give it. "The whole matter has now 
become a military one. You will have to give the final 
answer," Murphy said. Eisenhower accepted the agreement on 
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the basis that, "we [the Allies] have no legal or other 
right arbitrarily to establish ... a puppet government of our 
own choosing." In stating this position, Eisenhower 
conveniently forgot his own plans to establish an American-
supported government headed by Giraud. 183 
Darlan and the other French commanders (including Giraud, 
Nogues, and Juin) arrived at the Hotel Saint-Georges at 2:00 
p.m. Eisenhower informed the group that he had accepted the 
Clark-Darlan agreement and as the representative of the 
British and American governments, he acknowledged Darlan as 
the highest civil authority in North Africa. Eisenhower 
said he had but one demand, that the French fully join the 
Allied cause and attack the Germans. Darlan agreed but then 
said he also had one demand, that metropolitan France be 
liberated and reconstructed. Eisenhower, of course, agreed 
but said he expected French help in liberating France. 184 
And so the agreement between Eisenhower and Darlan was 
approved. That evening, Darlan began issuing orders as 
Marshal Petain's successor. As agreed, he proclaimed all 
French North African territories in a state of war against 
Germany and Italy since they had broken the Armistice 
agreement and invaded Unoccupied France. 185 
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Meanwhile, Eisenhower had flown back to Gibraltar to send 
a message notifying the Combined Chiefs of Staff about the 
arrangements with Darlan. This message alarmed the ccs, 
particularly the British. Many of the British officers felt 
it was morally wrong to cut deals with men who collaborated 
with Hitler, as Darlan had. Many of those who had sided 
with Churchill early in the struggle against fascism asked 
the prime minister, "Is this then what we are fighting 
for?,, 106 
But the Darlan Deal also raised political considerations. 
Charles de Gaulle's Free French movement had been left out 
of the planning for the North African landings because of 
local sentiment, and because President Roosevelt disliked 
him. Giraud was chosen as the Allied point man for the 
North African operation precisely because he had no Vichy 
connections. Churchill felt he could convince de Gaulle to 
support Giraud, but de Gaulle would never support Darlan, 
who was an outspoken critic of the Free French movement. 187 
Not long after Eisenhower had notified the ccs of the 
North African arrangement, he was informed of the British 
reaction. Eisenhower knew he had to justify the Darlan 
Deal; if he did not, President Roosevelt could dissolve the 
agreement. In addition, there was the question of the 
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Soviets. Would Stalin conclude that the U.S. and the U.K. 
where prepared to cut deals with Nazi collaborators, leaving 
the Soviet Union to fight Germ.any alone?188 Eisenhower's 
full report, sent the morning of November 14, provides 
excellent insight into the Supreme Commander's thinking. 
Despite American efforts to minimize French resistance to 
the Allied landings, Eisenhower claimed the Vichy regime was 
well entrenched in North Africa. The entire French 
resistance had been based on the belief that Petain opposed 
the invasion. "The military and naval leaders, as well as 
the civil governors, agree that only one man has the obvious 
right to assume the mantle of Petain and that man is Admiral 
Darlan," Eisenhower argued. 189 
By securing a cease-fire through Darlan, Eisenhower 
wrote, the American goals could be advanced more quickly. 
Continued French resistance would only delay the American 
advance on the German lines in Tunisia. In addition, 
keeping the existing French administration intact meant that 
few Allied troops would be left behind to preserve order. 
"In Morocco alone," Eisenhower said, "General Patton 
estimates 60,000 Allied troops would be required to control 
the Moroccan tribes. 11190 
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I assure you that only after incessant examination 
of the important factors have these agreements 
been made. They are essential in order to get on 
with the military objectives against the Axis and 
advance the interests of the Allies in winning 
this war. 191 
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Eisenhower then asked that a public statement be withheld 
for a short while. Giraud had proved unpopular among French 
officers in North Africa. It was thought best to let the 
French deal with the issue before the Allies made an 
announcement. 192 
Upon receiving Eisenhower's report, the ccs forwarded it 
to President Roosevelt, then at his home in Hyde Park, New 
York. According to Office of war Information official 
Robert Sherwood, who was present when the president received 
the report, "Roosevelt was deeply impressed by it and, as he 
read it with the same superb distribution of emphasis that 
he used in his public speeches, he sounded as if he were 
making an eloquent plea for Eisenhower before the bar of 
history. "193 
Eisenhower had also sent the report to Prime Minister 
Churchill. "Please be assured," Eisenhower prefaced the 
message, "that I have too often listened to your sage advice 
to be completely handcuffed and blindfolded by all the 
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slickers with which this part of the world is so thickly 
populated." 
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Churchill too was impressed by Eisenhower's reasoning. 194 
And so the Supreme Commander secured his needed support in 
the upper echelons of the Allied leadership. The next day, 
November 15, Darlan made his public proclamation and the 
public learned the full extent of the Clark-Darlan Deal: 
Since the invasion of the free zone against which 
he protested as solemnly as circumstances 
permitted, the Marshal finds it impossible to make 
known his intimate thoughts to the French. All 
means of communication are, moreover, under German 
control. The Marshal telegraphed me on November 
9th that he was satisfied with my presence in 
Africa. He gave me renewed assurance of his 
complete confidence. On November 11th, believing 
me deprived of my liberty he delegated authority 
to General Nogues. On November 13th General 
Nogues recognizing my complete liberty of action 
returned to me, with the approval of the Marshal, 
the powers which had devolved on him. Under these 
conditions I declare: Legionnaires, officials of 
all ranks, officers, non-commissioned officers, 
and privates of the army, navy and air-force of 
Africa who have taken the oath of fidelity to the 
Marshal should consider that they are faithful to 
the Marshal in executing my orders. 
I take upon myself sole responsibility for this 
decision, which has only the single object of 
assuring the good of the Empire and the national 
unity. 
194Ibid. 
I have designated as military Commander a great 
soldier, General Henri Giraud, who has always 
served France with honor. 
ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET DARLAN. 195 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE PUBLIC REACTS 
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Until the time of Eisenhower's agreement with Darlan, the 
press coverage of the North African campaign had been 
overwhelmingly positive. As seen in the editorials covering 
the first few days after the North African landings, the 
Allied media routinely characterized the campaign as proof 
of the United States' commitment to the defeat of 
dictatorial Axis regimes, the restoration freedom and hope 
to occupied nations, and support of other allied nations. 
The news of the Darlan Deal quickly ended these favorable 
characterizations. 
The American and British press immediately characterized 
the Darlan Deal as an abandonment of the principles embodied 
in Roosevelt's Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter. 
These statements were supposed to provide the moral reasons 
for which the war was being fought. Instead of discrediting 
fascists by defeating them militarily, the Allies were now 
reaching accommodations with them. To the press, this 
smacked of the appeasement policies the British and French 
governments had followed prior to the war. Then, granting 
Hitler many of his territorial and political desires, no 
matter how illegal or unprincipled those desires might be, 
the Allies had sought to prevent war. 
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These arguments appeared on the editorial pages of many 
American newspapers between November 12 and November 18. In 
a sampling of 12 major American newspapers, the Darlan Deal 
was discussed in a total of 12 editorials, syndicated 
columns and letters to the editor. Ten of these opinion 
pieces expressed outright opposition to the Darlan Deal; 
only two opinion pieces portrayed the Darlan Deal favorably. 
Similar negative feelings were expressed towards Darlan 
himself. In the same 12 newspapers, 14 columns, editorials 
or letters to the editor appeared which directly discussed 
Admiral Darlan. All 14 of these opinion pieces portrayed 
Darlan unfavorably. 
Darlan had not only collaborated with Hitler, but he also 
helped establish an authoritarian system within his own 
country. The Darlan Deal potentially set an important 
precedent: that collaborators and fascists who came over to 
the Allied side would be rewarded. Eventually, these 
collaborators might set up fascist regimes after the war, 
allowing the immoral practices of these governments to 
continue. 
The New York Post argued these very points in its lead 
editorial on Monday, November 16, the day after the 
announcement of the Eisenhower-Darlan Deal. The Post argued 
that the United States must immediately dispose of Darlan, 
who must not hold a position of importance, even 
temporarily. Supporting Darlan threatened to undermine the 
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Allies' moral position. The Allies advocated a complete 
destruction of fascism, which they had begun to pursue by 
invading Africa. The invasion destroyed the Vichy 
administration in North Africa and crippled it in 
metropolitan France. By supporting Darlan, America showed a 
weakness of purpose: 196 
We have made a magnificent start in Africa. As 
word of it sifts through the nets of nazidom it 
brings hope and resolution to millions. They must 
not hear that in our next move we got off on the 
wrong foot, that we were marching in step with 
such a one as Darlan. 
Down with Darlan! 197 
The Christian Science Monitor discussed the moral 
implications of the Darlan Deal in a November 16 editorial 
titled "Darlan." On the surface, the Darlan Deal seemed to 
sacrifice many basic principles, the paper said. The French 
admiral, as a member of the Vichy Government, supported a 
system of government directly opposed to the American one. 
How can the Vichy order be so quickly dispelled? 
Is there no moral principle in this struggle? Are 
we going to take in any turncoat Fascist and 
reward him? If this is political warfare, what 
does it do to those Frenchmen who have held the 
196
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front lines of resistance to Hitler and his 
puppets ?198 
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After raising these questions, the Christian Science 
Monitor then urged its readers to refrain from judgment 
until all the facts about the North African situation had 
become known. For instance, the paper said, perhaps Darlan 
broke with Vichy and had gone to Africa for refuge. 
Perhaps, Vichy planned to re-enter the war, as Petain's 
statement that Germany had broken the armistice suggested, 
and Darlan was only carrying out the marshal's wishes. 199 
No one can morally support any sort of relations with 
Darlan, the paper argued, but war is "seldom a matter of 
simple morality ... it often appears to offer only a choice 
between evils." Until the reasons for Eisenhower's 
agreement with Darlan are explained, one cannot yet tell if 
the deal was justified. 200 Despite the paper's reluctance to 
take a position, it certainly helped legitimize public 
concern by claiming the moral issues involved were truly 
important. 
The strongest criticism that emerged in the days 
immediately following the announcement came from the 
political arena. Roosevelt's 1940 Republican presidential 
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challenger, Wendell Willkie, intended to publicly condemn 
the arrangement during a speech at the New York Herald 
Tribune Forum on Current Problems on November 16. 201 When 
Willkie released the text of his speech to the press, it 
contained a harsh protest of negotiations with fascists: 
Shall we in America be quiet, for instance, when 
our leaders after promising freedom to the French 
people, put into control over them the very man 
who has helped to enslave them? Shall we be quiet 
when we see our government's long appeasement of 
Vichy find its logical conclusion in our 
collaboration with Darlan, Hitler's tool? Such 
collaboration outrages the spirit of free people 
everywhere, whatever expediency dictated it. I 
tell you we cannot fight this war in silence, 
whatever our experts say. Because if we fight in 
silence, those same experts will, in the end, even 
winnin~ the war, win nothing but blood and 
ashes. 02 
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Before Willkie could deliver the speech, however, 
Secretary of war Henry Stimson called and asked him to 
remove any reference to Darlan. The request angered 
Willkie, but although his speech had already been released, 
he only condemned the "State Department's long appeasement 
of Vichy. 11203 
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Even without the direct reference to Darlan, Willkie 
criticized American North African policy. Throughout the 
speech, however, Willkie made reference to the need to 
define and assure adherence to the moral principles of the 
war, such as those in the Atlantic Charter. To let such 
matters rest until after the war risked losing the very 
things the United States fought for. "Even if war leaders 
apparently agree upon principles," Willkie said, "when they 
come to the peacetime-they make their own interpretations of 
their previous declarations. 11204 
Since the Atlantic Charter committed the Allies to 
destroying fascist regimes, and the united States had 
recognized a fascist government in North Africa to gain 
military advantage, the united States had reinterpreted its 
own declarations of principle. Willkie had criticized the 
Darlan Deal without mentioning it. 
More newspapers joined in the attack on the Darlan Deal 
on November 17. As in the previous days' editorials, the 
newspapers based their opposition to the Eisenhower-Darlan 
agreement on moral grounds. The Chicago Sun, in the 
editorial "The Cloud Over Africa," argued that deals with 
fascists threatened to break the anti-Nazi alliance apart. 
All the Allied groups that had fought with the U.S. against 
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the fascists must now wonder how much faith they could place 
in American statements. 
In this Africa affair we have treated with great 
disdain the Fighting French forces throughout the 
world, the Fighting French National Committee and 
its head, General de Gaulle, in London-men who 
have unfalteringly maintained the fight against 
Hitler since the fall of France. Having assured 
the world only a few days ago that at last we were 
really through with Vichy, we have set up what may 
turn out to be a new Vichy regime in Africa. 
General de Gaulle expresses the suspicion of many 
when he divorces the Fighting French from 
negotiations with Darlan and warns that a new 
Vichy regime will not be accepted by his movement. 
There are here seeds, moreover, of future deep 
impairment of American-Soviet relations. Russia 
has officially recognized the Fighting French 
National Committee. If we persist in fostering a 
reactionary French regime headed by a Vichyite, 
there is reason to expect that within France-where 
sentiment is overwhelmingly anti-Vichy-we shall 
produce a swing toward Communism. The menace to 
American-Russian teamwork need not be labored 
here ... 205 
A milder form of criticism emerged from the New York 
Herald Tribune. In its editorial "Patience and 
Understanding," the Herald Tribune argued that Eisenhower 
was justified in negotiating with Darlan, who they labeled 
"the arch-Anglophobe, the collaborator, third in rank among 
the men of Vichy." By doing so, Eisenhower had been able to 
free North Africa and, possibly, other Vichy colonies. 206 At 
20511 The Cloud Over Africa," The Chicago Sun, 17 
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the same time, the Herald recognized that deals with 
fascists might undermine the Allied commitment to the war. 
To redeem itself, the paper seemed to say, the U.S. should 
formally embrace the Free French. To the paper, de Gaulle 
and the Free French, who had continued the war against 
Hitler after the French defeat, represented the struggle to 
preserve democratic forms. This would reassure all Allies 
that the U.S. remained dedicated to preserving democracy. 
At the same time the De Gaullists deserve at least 
equal consideration from the American government. 
They represent more than a policy of unceasing 
resistance to Hitler-great though the benefits 
which the United Nations have already derived from 
that policy may be. They also stand for the best 
of the old France, the real France, the France of 
liberty, equality and fraternity to which 
President Roosevelt appealed as the Americans went 
into North Africa ... While pursuing the immediate 
military aims of the Allied forces in North 
Africa, it is essential that the Fighting French 
in London be kept informed of those aims and the 
measures being taken to realize them. The 
ultimate objective of the Allies must be to enlist 
all patriotic Frenchmen in the war, and that 
cannot be attained by fostering doubts among those 
who have never laid down their arms. If patience 
and understanding are demanded of the Fighting 
French, they are obviously entitled to receive 
frankness and cordiality in return. 207 
The Minneapolis Morning Tribune was more conspicuous in 
what it didn't say than it what it did. In its November 17 
editorial "What Darlan Means," the Morning Tribune did not 
offer any explanations or reasons to support Eisenhower's 
207 Ibid. 
deal with Darlan. Indeed, the paper had harsh words for 
Darlan. 
Though there isn't any profitable point in 
accepting him [Darlan] as a flaming convert to the 
cause of the United Nations. That he is not, and 
it is doubtful if he ever will be. He is a 
Frenchman who never will forgive Germany nor 
Britain, and a European who always will be able to 
keep his affection for the United States within 
reasonable bounds. 208 
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Instead, the paper's editorial sounds like an attempt to 
make something good out of a bad situation. Aside from the 
negatives that Darlan brought with him, the fact that the 
admiral joined the Allied cause pointed to an even greater 
victory, one that should have rallied the Allied spirit: 
While all this is not particularly flattering, his 
[Darlan's] accession to our ranks can only mean 
one thing and that is that he has come to the 
conclusion that Hitler's star is on the wane and 
that it is only a matter of time until it will 
sink below the horizon. This judgment, which is 
not appreciably affected by any sentimental 
considerations, is all the more encouraging 
because it is devoid of wishful thinking. 
Darlan, of course, has a decided advantage over 
Petain when it comes to any expression of honest 
views, in that he is without the reach of the 
Nazis. The aged marshal, who has not displayed 
any of the Darlan bitterness, might talk in 
different terms if he were in Africa instead of in 
the hands of the Hitlerites. The trend of events 
in Tunis and Algeria suggest this. 209 
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The San Francisco Chronicle also gave some measure of 
support while issuing a warning. In its November 17 
editorial "Darlan," the paper stated that issues surrounding 
Vichy have never been more unclear. Although the public 
must assume that Eisenhower "has reason for what he is doing 
with Darlan and the others" the Allies should not trust the 
assurances of any former Vichy officials. The Chronicle 
cited the French release of $200 million of Belgian gold to 
the Germans on November 6, before the North African 
invasion, as proof of Vichy collaboration with the enemy. 210 
If the French Government sought to support Nazi ideals, why 
should the Americans expect that Vichy officials would now 
support Allied ideals? 
There must be some significance in the reported 
arrival in Algiers of former Premier Etienne 
Flandin and former Minister of the Interior Pierre 
Pucheu, yet this is confusing. Flandin has been 
amongst the appeasers. Do they think the American 
horse is the one to back now or are they up to 
something else?211 
The New York Times seized on the Darlans deal's potential 
threat to the anti-Nazi alliance in its November 17 
editorial "Our French Policy." The Times admitted that 
there were many reasons for the public to be confused. The 
Free French, who never surrendered to Hitler, had not been 
21011 Darlan," The San Francisco Chronicle, 17 November 
1942, 18. 
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involved in the North African campaign. Instead, the U.S. 
had seemingly propped up Darlan "until a week ago the 
colleague of Laval." This gave the appearance of 
legitimizing fascism by negotiating with its agents instead 
of supporting the French group primarily opposed to its 
existence. This, the paper said, seems a rebirth of 
appeasement. 212 
After raising these issues, the Times tells its readers 
to refrain from judgment, much as the Christian Science 
Monitor did on November 16. The Times expressed faith that 
the U.S. government would soon solve the moral dilemmas 
imposed by the Darlan Deal. No agreement with fascists 
could overshadow the Allies' commitment to defeat the Axis. 
Whatever obscurities or apparent contradictions 
there may be in the present American political 
policy in North Africa, we do not for a moment 
believe that the course our Government is 
following means that we have mistaken our enemies 
for friends, or lost interest in the real cause 
for which our friends our fighting-namely, the 
life of the French Republic. We urge patience, 
and confidence, on the part of both the Americans 
and of their French colleagues in arms. The 
French Republic never had a better friend than the 
President who directs our policy in this crisis. 213 
More anti-Darlan press appeared on November 18. The St. 
Louis Dispatch, for instance, attacked Darlan directly in 
212
"0ur French Policy," The New York Times, 17 November 
1942, 24. 
213 Ibid. 
94 
"Darlan's Latest Flip-Flop." The paper warned readers of 
Darlan's unreliability and encouraged the military to keep a 
close watch on the admiral. That the Dispatch disapproved 
of the deal there can be little doubt. The paper branded 
Darlan as a Nazi collaborationist who displayed loose 
convictions, a particularly noteworthy attack in a war 
fought largely on conviction. 
Only a few weeks ago, Admiral Jean Darlan was 
among the strongest advocates of French 
collaboration with Nazi Germany, and an avowedly 
bitter enemy of the British. Now he is co-
operating with the American occupying forces in 
North Africa, has set himself up as civil 
administrator there and has called on the French 
fleet to join the Allies. 
So the former chief of all Vichy's armed forces 
has completed another flip-flop by again going 
over to the seemingly winning side. He had 
double-crossed his own country by siding with its 
conquerors; now he turns around and double-crosses 
the Nazis. The slippery Darlan is burning no 
bridges behind him, however. He avows his 
continued loyalty to Petain, but says the 
Marshal's orders must be disregarded "because he 
is unable to let the French people know his real 
thoughts .... " 
Now that this treacherous opportunist has swung 
over to the Allied side, in an effort to save his 
own skin, he may be of help in keeping the fleet 
out of Nazi clutches. Undoubtedly; however, the 
Allied commanders are watching him closely while 
making use of his services. Darlan's slimy record 
shows that he is capable of betraying his new 
found friends if events seem to be going against 
them. 214 
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On November 19, a letter to the editor titled "Darlan and 
the Atlantic Charter," appeared in the Minneapolis Star 
Journal. The writer, Frank Adams, questioned the morality 
of the Darlan Deal. He wanted to know how General 
Eisenhower explained the principles of the Atlantic Charter 
to Darlan and how, in turn, Darlan had the moral authority 
to explain them to the French people. To the writer, Darlan 
was as abhorrent as Vidkun Quisling. Quisling, a former 
Norwegian minister of war and Nazi sympathizer, had provided 
secret military information to the Nazis which assisted the 
German invasion of Norway. 215 
If appointing Darlan to the head of the French 
North African government will help win the war, I 
am for it, but it will take a lot of proving to 
make me see it. Anyway, I don't think we are 
fighting to restore Quislings in government 
positions. 216 
A column titled "Darlan Forte In Africa Is Still 
Obscure" appeared in the November 19 issue of the Oregonian. 
The columnist, Dorothy Thompson, refused to believe the 
Untied States would set up a Vichy government in North 
Africa. If American policy was to promote Roosevelt's Four 
Freedoms throughout the world, then all fascist regimes must 
be destroyed. Darlan's career was built on tearing down the 
215Weinberg, A world At Arms, 114. 
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principles embodied in the Four Freedoms, not building them 
up. To support Darlan would be to ignore the moral 
underpinnings of the Four Freedoms. 
Vichy France, under the prominent leadership of 
Admiral Darlan, was a pallid beige naziism. It 
abolished the motto of "liberty, equality and 
fraternity"; it destroyed every vestige of popular 
government; ... it participated in the deportation 
of Jews to Poland; it dissolved trade unions and 
suppressed the free press ... it produced armaments 
for the German war effort ... and caused the deaths 
of an unknown number of Frenchmen and Americans. 
Neither freedom of speech, nor freedom from fear 
is possible under Vichy leaders. Therefore one 
must regard the present political situation as an 
interval in an unconsolidated military 
situation. 217 
Press Reaction in the united Kingdom 
Perhaps the deepest criticism of the Darlan Deal 
materialized in the United Kingdom. The deal seemed to 
repudiate the meaning of the struggle the British people had 
been engaged in for over three long years, even more so for 
a nation that had recognized de Gaulle and the Free French. 
Darlan represented the epitome of the French defeatism that 
had left Britain alone to fight against Hitler. 
The London Times addressed these issues in its November 
17 editorial "The Destiny of France." Since the June 1940 
French defeat, the paper said, France had fallen into 
217Dorothy Thompson, "Darlan Forte in Africa is Still 
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"physical and moral prostration." Marshal Petain had become 
a symbol of this hopelessness and passivity. "He has 
offered nothing more than passive resistance, at best, to 
the active collaboration with Germany pressed upon France 
by ... Laval and others." Petain had also resisted all 
efforts to aid the Allied cause. This Vichy policy, "with 
the undisguised approval of Berlin, has been undermining the 
republican traditions of 1789 and after. 11218 
Because these policies had split French society, it had 
become impossible for the Allies to appoint French groups to 
administer freed French territory. Such a transfer of 
authority could only happen if there were "an overwhelming 
consensus of opinion among Frenchmen ... on the 
representative character of the individual or group 
concerned." In November 1942, that consensus was impossible 
at the time. For this reason, the Western Allies had to 
administer French colonies and territories in trust for the 
French people. 
The Times argued that these were the moral obligations 
that the Allies owed the French. Only the people of a 
liberated France, with its institutions of free expression 
and democracy restored, could legitimately decide the fate 
of France. The Darlan Deal made the restatement of these 
imperatives all the more important. Significantly, the 
21811 The Destiny of France," The Times (London), 17 
November 1942, 5. 
Times contrasted Darlan's experience with that of Giraud, 
who never accepted a Vichy position. 
Admiral Darlan's services in the restoration of 
order and confidence have been accepted by the 
allied command. His record since 1940 makes the 
choice, to say the least of it, unexpected. But 
for the moment his cooperation with General Giraud 
{whose unimpeachable record is the subject on this 
page this morning) and with General Nogues is 
assured. 219 
French unity was not needed immediately, the paper said. 
What was needed was unified and effective action to defeat 
the Axis. Once this happened, the French people could 
choose their own system of government. 
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The stating of this position was clear. The Times 
claimed that self-determination and liberation must always 
be the Allied goal for France. These were the basic 
principles the Allies were fighting for. Under no 
circumstances would the Times condone the recognition of a 
neo-Vichy government headed by Darlan or any other fascist. 
To recognize any government other than that chosen by the 
French people would be counter to the Atlantic Charter's 
position of restoring democracy to enslaved peoples. 
The Manchester Guardian, in its November 18 editorial, 
"The Darlan Mystery," also argued that the Darlan Deal 
should not prepare the way for a post-war fascist government 
in France. The Guardian asked its readers to consider 
219 Ibid. 
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Darlan's reasons for switching from the Axis to the Allied 
camp. The paper saw one of two possibilities: That Marshal 
Petain had sent Darlan to North Africa to establish a pro-
Vichy government in the Allied camp, or Darlan could have 
come of his own accord, angered by his loss of status at 
Vichy. In either case, a dangerous Vichyite system, in 
control of an African empire, survived the war. 220 
If a Fascist or semi-Fascist party is built up now 
in Northern Africa France may be precipitated at 
the peace into a civil war. Just as Petain and 
Weygand argued for surrender to Germany in June, 
1940, on the ground that if the war went on there 
would be a Communist revolution, so again 
Frenchman who want France to restore democracy and 
take her place on the side of the Atlantic Charter 
may be warned that nothing but the rule of this 
Fascist party and the preservation of the Vichy 
revolution can save France from anarchy ... If 
that plot is organized by the men who betrayed 
France the bitterness of the struggle that will 
follow will be implacable. 221 
The same day, a letter to the editor appeared in the 
London Times that hinted how deeply the democratic principal 
behind the war ran in the public. The author, D. Saurat, 
argued that the Western Allies must assume responsibility 
for the liberated French territories. Delegating 
responsibility to the various French groups ran great risks. 
22011 The Darlan Mystery," The Manchester Guardian, 18 
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Two great dangers are looming ahead: the 
potentiality of civil war among the French, the 
disappearance of the democratic principal for the 
French ... In de Gaulle's committee, it has not 
been found possible to make use of any democratic 
principal: the commissaires nationaux are 
responsible only to de Gaulle. Darlan, on the 
other side, founds his powers on le Marechal, and 
therefore is not likely to re-establish 
democracy. 222 
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To preserve democratic forms, the author recommended 
calling an assembly of exiled representative Frenchmen, as 
General de Gaulle had advocated. The body would be composed 
of members of the French Parliament currently living in 
Allied territories as well as distinguished French writers, 
diplomats, and administrators of high rank living outside 
occupied France. Although the body would have no real 
power, since it wouldn't truly represent France, it would 
preserve French democratic forms. 
So far we have only generals and admirals speaking 
for France. Should they not be the servants of 
the State and not its masters? The leaders of the 
united Nations are great democrats, they are 
negotiating with the generals and admirals. But 
in your own words they are responsible to the 
people of France. 223 
Criticism of the Darlan Deal also appeared in Parliament. 
On November 11, King George VI praised the landings in North 
Africa as "notable steps towards final victory," in his 
222D. Saurat, "French Democracy," The Times (London), 
18 November 1942, 5. 
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annual address to Parliament, written by Churchill's 
coalition government. 224 Members of the House of Commons 
used the King's reference in order to denounce the Darlan 
Deal. The Darlan issues was raised eight times while the 
House debated the King's Speech. 
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On November 12, even before the Darlan Deal had been 
announced, one Member of Parliament, Aneurin Bevan, told the 
Commons that the Allies should never negotiate with Admiral 
Darlan. "Admiral Darlan is a bad man; he is a bad man from 
whatever point of view you like to regard him. "225 He 
recognized that such negotiations might carry some 
advantages, such as saving lives, but the Allies should not 
sacrifice their principles for immediate gains. Instead, 
full support should be given to de Gaulle. 
He is no longer a man; he is a symbol. Therefore, 
I say do not try to put these traitorous 
quislings, these rats now leaving the sinking 
ship, in place of men who stood staunchly by our 
side in our most difficult days. 226 
224 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 386 
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CHAPTER V 
ROOSEVELT'S STATEMENT 
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The White House rushed to respond to press criticism, but 
not always with Eisenhower's best interests in mind. The 
State Department urged Roosevelt to order Eisenhower not to 
retain any former Vichy officials "to whom well founded 
objections might be taken." Admiral William D. Leahy, the 
former American ambassador to Vichy and then Roosevelt's 
chief of staff, stopped the order. Leahy told Roosevelt 
that Eisenhower needed a degree of freedom in order to 
accomplish the u. s.' objectives. 227 
Secretary of War Harry Stimson demanded more freedom and 
support be given to Eisenhower. He told Roosevelt that the 
American people needed to hear a defense of Eisenhower by 
the president before criticism of the Darlan Deal would 
subside. Roosevelt was reluctant to make this defense; his 
policy of continued relations with Vichy had been widely 
criticized but the President had never defended it. But now 
all of the President's major advisors felt a statement was 
necessary. 228 
Unless Roosevelt said the Darlan Deal did not represent a 
sacrifice of American war principles, criticism might 
227Ambrose, 130-131. 
228Ibid. , 131. 
continue to build. Possibly, the public might become 
disillusioned and support for the war would weaken. 
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A message Roosevelt received from Churchill on November 
17 may have helped convince the President that he needed to 
support Eisenhower publically. In it, the Prime Minister 
took the position argued by many of the American and British 
newspapers: the Darlan Deal undermined the Allies' position 
as the defenders of democracy. 
I ought to let you know that very deep currents of 
feeling are stirred by the arrangement with 
Darlan. The more I reflect upon it the more 
convinced I become that it can only be a temporary 
expedient justifiable solely by the stress of 
battle. We must not overlook the serious 
political injury which may be done to our cause, 
not only in France but throughout Europe, by the 
feeling that we are ready to make terms with the 
local quislings. Darlan has an odious record. It 
is he who has incalculated in the French Navy its 
malignant disposition by promoting his creatures 
to command. It is but yesterday that French 
sailors were sent to their death against your line 
off Casablanca and now, for the sake of power and 
office, Darlan plays the turncoat. A permanent 
arrangement with Darlan or the formation of a 
Darlan government in French North Africa would not 
be understood by the great masses of ordinary 
people whose simple loyal ties are our strength. 229 
The Prime Minister's comments were reinforced by a 
message sent on the same day from the British Foreign Office 
to its embassy in Washington. The message spelled out the 
official British position that although the Allies might 
have to deal with Darlan for military expediency, his role 
229Feis, 7. 
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in the Vichy government made any long-term acceptance 
untenable: "There is above all our own moral position ... We 
are fighting for international decency and Darlan is the 
antithesis of this. 11230 
At any rate Roosevelt agreed that some sort of statement 
was called for. The President asked Milton Eisenhower, an 
Office of war Information official and General Eisenhower's 
younger brother, for a draft statement. Roosevelt made 
significant changes to the statement, adding the word 
"temporary" in a number of places. The President delivered 
the statement at a press conference on November 17. 231 
I have accepted General Eisenhower's political 
arrangements made for the time being in Northern 
and Western Africa. 
I thoroughly understand and approve the feeling in 
the United States and Great Britain and among all 
the other United Nations that in view of the 
history of the past two years no permanent 
arrangement should be made with Admiral Darlan. 
People in the United Nations likewise would never 
understand the recognition of a reconstituting of 
the Vichy Government in France or in any French 
territory. 
We are opposed to Frenchmen who support Hitler and 
the Axis. No one in our Army has any authority to 
discuss the future Government of France and the 
French Empire. 
The future French Government will be established, 
not by any individual in Metropolitan France or 
overseas, but by the French people themselves 
230Ambrose, 130. 
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after they have been set free by the stress of 
battle .... 
The present temporary arrangement has accomplished 
two military objectives. The first was to save 
American and British lives, and French lives on 
the other hand. 
The second was the vital factor of time. The 
temporary arrangement has made it possible to 
avoid a "mopping up" period in Algiers and Morocco 
which might have taken a month to two to 
consummate. Such a period would have delayed the 
concentration for the attack from the West on 
Tunis, and we hope on Tripoli .... 
Admiral Darlan's proclamation assisted in making a 
"mopping up" period unnecessary. Temporary 
arrangements made with Admiral Darlan apply, 
without exception, to the current local situation 
only. 
I have requested the liberation of all persons in 
Northern Africa who had been imprisoned because 
they opposed the efforts of the Nazis to dominate 
the world, and I have asked for the abrogation of 
all laws and decrees inspired by Nazi Governments 
or Nazi ideologist. Reports indicate that the 
French of North Africa are subordinating all 
political questions to the formation of a common 
front against the common enemy. 232 
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By making the statement, Roosevelt argued that dealing 
with fascists for military expediency did not weaken the 
commitment of the Allies to restoring individual freedoms. 
The president used the Darlan issue as an example to 
reassure the public that making use of collaborators to 
achieve military aims in exchange for reconstituting fascist 
232
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regimes after the war would be a violation of the trust the 
people placed in their leaders. 
The President's statement seemed to have a calming effect 
on the media. Many newspapers now argued that Roosevelt's 
statement confirmed that the Allies were still dedicated to 
the principles for which the war was being fought. They 
also voiced optimism that the French admiral would be 
eventually removed from his position in North Africa. 
In effect, Roosevelt's statement redirected the focus of 
public's anger. With the moral justification of the war 
reaffirmed and the Darlan Deal justified as a life saving 
measure, the press no longer had any reason to directly 
attack the bargain. In a sense, Roosevelt had given it a 
moral justification of its own, saving lives. 
This shift in the editorial stance of the American 
newspapers can clearly be seen in a sampling of 17 major 
American newspapers between November 19 and November 22. 
Before Roosevelt's statement, the majority of opinion pieces 
that discussed the Darlan Deal opposed it. But after the 
President's statement this changed; of 23 syndicated 
columns, editorials or letters to the editor, 19 now 
portrayed the Darlan Deal favorably. 
But the concept of negotiating with collaborators and 
fascists continued to be unpopular. The press continued to 
voice displeasure by portraying Admiral Darlan as extremely 
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untrustworthy because of his association with French Vichy 
Government and its collaboration with Nazi Germany. 
Evidence of the public's continued refusal to accept 
Darlan can also be found in the November 19 to November 22 
sampling of 17 American newspapers. While the majority of 
editorials and letters to the editor were now offering 
support for the Darlan Deal, the number of negative 
portrayals of Admiral Darlan only increased. In 22 
syndicated columns, editorials or letters to the editor that 
expressed opinions about Admiral Darlan, not one offered a 
favorable evaluation. 
The press also praised the public for questioning the 
ethics of the Darlan Deal. The public concern, as reflected 
in the press, indicated that the citizens of the Allied 
nations opposed Fascism of any type. The press argued that 
the Darlan incident proved the public understood that 
liberal western beliefs were under attack by Nazism and only 
a complete defeat of fascist forces could preserve 
democratic way of life. 
The New York Post recognized the force of public opinion 
in its November 18 editorial "The President Speaks." The 
paper praised Roosevelt for giving "consummate proof that 
the questions which trouble all decent democrats are 
uppermost in his own mind. "233 The Post noted that the 
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President referred to the deal as a temporary military 
arrangement justified because it saved lives. The Post 
congratulated the American public, too. The paper claimed 
the outcry over Darlan proved that public sentiment wanted a 
complete destruction of fascist and Nazi ideas. 
The pressure by decent, democratic opinion against 
Darlan strengthened the President, made it 
inevitable that he would break the ice, led us 
straight toward this grand moment of 
clarification. 
Had the American part of the world kept quiet, our 
allies everywhere might still be dazed, baffled 
and bewildered. The pressure of opinion made a 
solution necessary, and it was forthcoming .... 
.. . For the benefit of timid officials everywhere: 
DOWN WITH DARLAN, as we said on Monday. 234 
The Christian Science Monitor, offered tentative support 
for the Darlan arrangement in its November 18 editorial 
titled "Deals with Darlans." As justification for the 
Darlan Deal, the paper noted Roosevelt's explanation that 
the military situation demanded the Allies reach some 
understanding with Darlan. The Allied efforts to secure a 
quick surrender were hampered since the Allied choice for 
the French leadership, General Giraud, was viewed as a 
traitor by the French in North Africa, and since Darlan had 
helped install the North African administration. The need 
to negotiate and meet Darlan's demands proved greater than 
234 Ibid. 
109 
the risk of using the American military to prop up a fascist 
regime. 235 However, the paper warned its readers not to 
trust Darlan. The admiral may have a hidden purpose behind 
his switch to the Allied camp. 
More than a doubt remains, of course, as to how 
much authority can be entrusted to Darlan. Two 
can always play at a game which one may imagine 
oneself to the playing alone. There are risks 
involved in deals with Darlan 
So far the risks would appear to be worth the 
taking. Doubtless they have saved both American 
and French lives. And the time they have saved 
may prove crucial. But even more will have to be 
known before anxieties are quite set at rest. For 
example, what was Darlan's price? Or has the 
ruthlessness of France's conqueror, and the turn 
of battle's tide, at last confounded the confusion 
that was Vichy? 236 
On November 18, the Louisville Courier Journal published 
a long editorial, titled "Our Deal With Darlan was a 
Military Coup," supporting Eisenhower. The paper praised 
Eisenhower not for negotiating with Darlan, who remained a 
Vichy collaborator, but for taking advantage of the 
situation. 
The Courier Journal bemoaned the divisiveness the Darlan 
Deal created among the Allies. As proof of the 
disenchantment of the allied powers, the paper wrote that 
the Fighting French were "openly bitter" and the British 
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House of Commons wanted an explanation of the "most 
mysterious chapter of this war and of all countries. "237 But 
the paper claims this outrage was uncalled for; Roosevelt's 
explanation that the Darlan Deal was temporary and only 
reached for military reasons was the only explanation 
needed. 
Darlan had much to offer the Allies, the Courier Journal 
told its readers. As Vichy's Defense Minister, the Admiral 
could strongly influence other French generals in North 
Africa. Not only could he bring the French army over to the 
Allied camp, but he might persuade the French fleet as well. 
"Of course, the transaction was not ideal," the paper said, 
in order to acknowledge that Darlan was an undesirable 
character. "But wars are not waged according to Hoyle and 
any advantage over the enemy is seized. 11238 
The Courier Journal claimed to understand the concerns of 
the Fighting French. The group feared being overshadowed by 
an American-supported fascist government. Eisenhower did 
not plan to let that happen, the paper told its readers. 
Darlan had helped save lives and material, none of which 
could be spared, but once his usefulness expired, he would 
be thrown away. The Eisenhower-Darlan Deal "is like our 
policy of playing along with Vichy although he recognized it 
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was a puppet of Hitler. In war you take help wherever you 
can get it. "239 
The divisive repercussions to the Darlan affair 
are unfortunate in creating a spirit of disunity 
in the anti-Axis camp. But the facts should 
settle the hullabaloo and the facts seem to be 
that Eisenhower acted brilliantly and effectively 
for the best interests of the United Nations. 240 
On November 19, the New York Post put forward an 
editorial that gave an in-depth analysis of Roosevelt's 
statement. In doing so, the paper had abandoned its 
opposition and now fully supported the Darlan policy. 
Those of us who have been deeply disturbed over 
General Eisenhower's collaboration with Darlan-and 
we are millions all over the earth-can accept 
President Roosevelt's statement on the subject 
gratefully and in good faith. 
In content and in timing it was a superb 
accomplishment of statesmanship. It is an 
explanation of a specific occurrence and an 
affirmation of principles for our future guidance. 
It ranks with and supplements the Atlantic 
Charter. 241 
Although the paper sounded words of support, it didn't 
back off from its position that Darlan could not be trusted. 
As proof of the Post's opposition to Darlan, the paper asked 
questions designed to highlight the French admiral's 
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untrustworthiness. These questions included: Who is to 
determine when Darlan should step down? What have the 
Allies done to prevent Darlan from gaining too much 
political power? Could Darlan still be in power when the 
offensive in Europe begins? Could Darlan switch sides yet 
again? 242 
The paper stated that answers to those questions needed 
to come quickly in order to convince: 
the common man of enslaved Europe ... that if and 
when we deal with their Darlans or Quislings that 
we ... use them for whatever they can contribute in 
information, or as decoys, but never as allies. 243 
In closing, the Post praised the public for questioning 
the North African arrangement, as it did in the previous 
day's editorial. To the paper, the public response 
indicated its deep opposition to fascist and totalitarian 
regimes: 
Frankly, we're delighted that so many people, here 
and in England, have shouted their questions ever 
since the first word of dealings with Darlan came 
out. Consider what it would signify if people 
didn't care enough to question transactions with a 
double action Quisling. 244 
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On the same day, November 19, commentator Johannes Steel 
also discussed the Darlan issue in the New York Post. In 
his "Steel Filings" column, the writer claimed that even 
though the President had promised that no permanent 
arrangement with Darlan had been made, a dangerous precedent 
had been established that damaged America's moral authority. 
Steel asked readers to consider what the people of Norway 
would say if the Allies temporarily appointed Quisling to a 
leadership position. 
Steel argued that the arrangement with Darlan, even as a 
temporary measure, had a profoundly negative psychological 
impact. Allied governments-in-exile must now ask themselves 
if the Americans would support local Quislings instead of 
the legitimate authorities once their nations were 
liberated. 245 
It is incontestable that our moral and political 
prestige in enslaved Europe has declined in direct 
proportion to the tremendous increase in our 
military prestige. we have committed one the 
worst blunders of the war. 246 
Because of the ethical questions the Darlan Deal raised, 
Steel continued, the "temporary and limited military 
245Johannes Steel, "Steel Filings: Suppose We Made 
Quisling the Ruler of Norway?" The New York Post, 19 
November 1942. 27. 
246 Ibid. 
114 
advantages" achieved through negotiations with Darlan might 
not "outweigh the political disadvantages. "247 
The Washington Post proposed to its November 19 readers 
that the Americans were in a better position to eliminate 
remnants of Vichy with Darlan than they would have been 
without him. In the editorial "Clearing The Air," the Post 
stated that Roosevelt supported Eisenhower's agreement with 
Darlan because it allowed us "to clinch our military hold on 
French North Africa. "248 Having accomplished that, the 
Darlan agreement put America in a position to demand the 
abolition of Nazi-influenced laws and demand the release of 
political prisoners. "Accordingly, far from constituting, 
as some have argued, an 'appeasement' policy, the efforts 
taken by General Eisenhower, in the light of his 
information, partook of military statesmanship of the most 
realistic and fruitful kind. 11249 
The columnist Samuel Grafton, in his November 19 "I'd 
Rather Be Right" column, argued that Roosevelt's statement 
on Darlan established two important precedents, the first 
being that fascists of any stripe eventually would be 
rejected by the Allies. 250 The second precedent that 
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Roosevelt established, according to Grafton, was that any 
person who supported even a few fascist ideals would be 
considered a die-hard opponent of the Four Freedoms. 
You have to remember that there are German 
Darlans, and Italian Darlans, and Czech Darlans, 
and Norwegian Darlans. The Darlan case is rich in 
its power to set precedents; it is bursting with 
precedents; Darlan's flight is a trial flight for 
fascists all over Europe. 251 
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The statement broke with the long-standing diplomatic 
reasoning that the U.S. dealt with a government, even a 
fascist government, simply because it had authority. 
However, the president promised to remove Darlan from his 
position once his usefulness had ended. This meant that the 
Allies would no longer recognize fascist authority. 
Authority was granted to individuals through democratic 
elections. 252 
In its November 19 editorial, "A Faith Reaffirmed," the 
Chicago Sun told readers that Roosevelt's statement was 
significant because it rejected any long term agreements 
with fascists. In accepting Darlan purely on military terms 
and rejecting any long-term political arrangements, the 
paper said Roosevelt reaffirmed the American faith in 
liberty and democracy. The Darlan affair also illustrated 
the public's recognition that America's opponents, with whom 
251 Ibid. 
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Darlan collaborated, opposed all that American society 
considered good. 
As a front-line soldier in the battle for 
democracy, Mr. Roosevelt has done what his record 
suggested he would do. That he acts with the full 
backing of an aroused public opinion is even more 
significant. In their distrust of Darlan and 
their demands for an explanation, the people have 
given good evidence that they fully understand the 
difference between a narrow military war and the 
kind of war in which we are actually engaged. 
They knew Darlan was out of place because they 
knew we are fighting not only against certain 
nations but against the evil forces of Fascism, 
which are not confined within national boundaries. 
In such a war the collaborators with Fascism 
belong on the Axis side of the lines, not ours. 253 
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The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, which had previously 
attacked Darlan's character in no uncertain terms, also 
welcomed Roosevelt's statement in "Darlan's Status Is 
Cleared Up" on November 19. The Dispatch claimed that 
Roosevelt and Eisenhower knew Darlan's record well. 
If the Allied leaders had ignored the opportunity to 
secure a surrender through Darlan, the North African 
campaign would have been longer and more costly. "The fact 
that Eisenhower accepted this help certainly did not mean 
that he was setting up a Vichy regime, American model, in 
253
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North Africa, or that he was attempting to dictate the 
future of France," the Dispatch assured readers. 254 
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After arguing this point, the paper made an astounding 
flip-flop of its own. As proof of his "slimy" character, 
the paper had noted on Nov. 18 that Darlan had not abandoned 
his fascist loyalties after switching sides. 255 Now, the 
Dispatch tried to make apologies for Darlan's fascist 
tendencies: 
An immediate gain from Mr. Roosevelt's statement 
is in quieting the uneasiness of General de 
Gaulle's followers. However, acceptance of 
Darlan's aid merely follows a principle laid down 
some time ago by the Fighting French movement 
itself. On Sept. 21, it was announced from London 
that Charles Vallin, former vice-president of the 
pro-Fascist movement know as Crois de Feu and an 
ex-supporter of Petain, had been received into the 
De Gaulle organization. This meant, William 
Stoneman wrote, that "anybody, no matter what his 
party or his political past, will be welcomed to 
the ranks of the Fighting French provided only 
that he is determined to fight the Germans .... " 
Vallin's action will make a deep impression upon 
many other former collaborators whose loyalty has 
been shaken by recent events. 
It was apparently the same line of reasoning that 
led to the acceptance of co~operation from Admiral 
Darlan for its immediate value in the North 
African war. 256 
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In its Nov. 19 editorial titled "A 'Temporary 
Expedient,'" the New York Herald Tribune claimed Roosevelt's 
explanation of the Darlan situation as temporary was exactly 
what the public needed to hear. In praising the president's 
explanation, the paper equated Darlan with the Norwegian 
Vidkun Quisling who aided the German invasion of his 
homeland. "The idea that we were trafficking with a 
Quisling for any reasons other than military necessity seems 
to us completely ended by this forthright utterance," the 
Herald Tribune said. The paper felt the reassurance that 
the French people were ultimately responsible for the future 
French Government would soothe a public upset over an 
American government embracing French fascists but remaining 
cool toward General de Gaulle. "The President is to be 
congratulated on making this plain, as well as upon making 
plain at the same time that no fundamental principles have 
been compromised," the paper argued. 257 The paper did not 
save its biggest congratulations for the president, however. 
Another group claimed that prize: 
It seems to us that congratulations are also owing 
to the Fighting French representatives who have so 
promptly understood and generously accepted the 
situation. In this they were only reflecting the 
attitude of General de Gaulle himself, who from 
the moment of the landing has spoken only as a 
French soldier and a French patriot in the noblest 
sense. It is an example which will shine only the 
257 
"A 'Temporary Expedient' , " The New York Herald 
Tribune, 19 November 1942, 26. 
brighter through the months against the more 
devious obscurities be~ueathed to us by the 
corruptions of Vichy. 25 
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The Saint Paul Pioneer Press endorsed the Eisenhower-
Darlan Deal in "Temporary Expedient" on November 19 but it 
stopped short of endorsing Darlan. The Pioneer Press 
claimed that President Roosevelt's statement on the affair 
"goes a long way to clear up a muddy, bad-tasting and 
incipiently dangerous situation." Since the Darlan Deal 
advanced the timetable of American forces in North Africa 
perhaps two or three months, it helped prevent the Axis from 
launching an organized counter-offensive. This alone 
justified the deal. The president's refusal to support any 
proposed government advanced by Darlan reinforced the 
importance of the issues for which the war was fought. 
This statement places Darlan where he belongs: A 
Vichyard who jumped to Africa to save his own skin 
when he saw the handwriting on the wall. It 
reveals that he has been used to assist the 
military occupation and will be discarded at the 
end of his usefulness instead of being allowed to 
step back into ~ower on the shoulders of the 
United Nations. 59 
The Atlanta Constitution threw its weight in favor of the 
Darlan Deal in an editorial titled "Forehanded Realism" on 
Nov. 20. This newspaper presents a typical editorial for 
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the period following Roosevelt's statement of support for 
the Eisenhower-Darlan pact. But Darlan himself was an 
unscrupulous individual who could not long be tolerated. 
The paper reports that the United States was dealing with a 
man of the lowest moral order. By extension, Darlan 
represented the opposite of the ideals for which the Allies 
were fighting. 
Darlan is a victim of two emotions. One is his 
overweening ambition and the other his jealous 
hatred of the British. As a French naval officer 
he has always been jealous of British naval 
supremacy and he has allowed that factor to taint 
his entire character and outlook. Add to this his 
compelling ambition for personal power and the 
man's character begins to be understandable. 260 
Chicago Sun writer Frank Smothers in a November 20 column 
titled "Mr. Roosevelt's Opportunity" claimed the president's 
statement on Darlan helped combat a growing cynicism toward 
the U.S. in the world community. This cynicism was brought 
about because of failures, like the Darlan incident, to 
prove America's belief in the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter. When the Atlantic Charter was issued, people in 
Asia, Europe, and America welcomed the pledge to respect the 
right of people to choose their own form of government, 
Smothers said. Roosevelt's statement helped reassure other 
nations that the Atlantic Charter still formed the country's 
26011 Forehanded Realism," The Atlanta Constitution, 20 
November 1942, 8. 
basic policy. That being so, Smothers challenged the 
president to continue to uphold the principles of the 
Atlantic Charter. 261 
Having spent most of the last decade in China and 
Europe I have learned that no statesman approached 
Mr. Roosevelt in the general world confidence he 
enjoys as a leader of democracy .... He can do 
more for a free Italy, free Spain, free Europe, 
free India, free society of nations ... But he can 
succeed only if he has the audacity to match his 
principles; and only if he acts as the agent of a 
people dedicated to freedom. 262 
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The Des Moines Register argued that the Darlan policy did 
not represent appeasement in "Reassurance About Darlan" on 
November 20. Negotiating with "turncoat ex-
collaborationists" did not mean that any principle had been 
sacrificed. Indeed, the United States would not "coldly 
ditch all our natural allies. "263 In other words, Darlan' s 
switch to the Allied camp was not caused by ideological 
motivations. His ideas did not fit with those of the Allies 
and because of that, he would never be allowed to have a 
formative role among the Allies. 
No person should look at the Darlan Deal as a political 
arrangement, only a military one, the paper said. To 
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support this position,the Register claimed the Darlan Deal 
didn't substantially change any of General Eisenhower's 
plans. American policy had been to place General Giraud in 
charge of the French North African military forces, the 
exact position Giraud received under Darlan. All Eisenhower 
did was use Darlan to improve the Allied military ends. 264 
Dorothy Thompson's November 20 "On the Record" column 
took issue with Roosevelt's statement because it implied 
American administration of the French North African 
colonies. It would be wrong, she wrote, for the president 
to restore the French republican constitution by demanding 
the repeal of the Nazi inspired laws and the release of Free 
French prisoners. The only legitimate method of restoring 
the French Constitution is to restore it in principle. 265 
Suppose that the whole U.S. were occupied by Nazis 
and Japanese. Suppose that these had found local 
Quislings and Lavals, who had abolished the 
Constitution and taken over the Administration and 
were ruling-and as Laval now is in all of France 
but Algeria-by decrees, resting on Nazi-Jap 
bayonets. Now suppose that an Anglo-American 
expeditionary force had landed in Maine, taken 
over the government, and established themselves. 
What would they do politically? What call would 
they send out to the people of America? Would 
they arbitrarily pick an administrator, or would 
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they then re-establish the American 
Cons ti tut ion?. . . . The analogy is exact. 266 
The Chicago Daily Tribune argued the same position as the 
Des Moines Register-that Eisenhower did not abandon American 
ideals by signing an agreement with Darlan, albeit more 
forcibly. In its November 21 editorial, "The Darlan 
Mystery," the Daily Tribune attacked the "bleeding hearts" 
who thought the Darlan Deal would "alienate friendship for 
us in France ... "267 The paper argued that this assumption is 
entirely wrong. The French knew the Germans and Italians 
coveted French colonies, colonies the Americans would just 
as soon leave alone. The French know that Hitler planned to 
dominate France politically and economically and that 
America fought in support of self-determination. Lastly, 
the paper argued, the Fighting French knew that they could 
never liberate France without American help. These factors 
should put to rest any fears of alienating the Free French 
or of splitting the Allied cause by negotiating with Darlan, 
even though he may be "the embodiment of wickedness. 11268 
Here is evidence that even one of the most adamant 
supporters of Eisenhower recognized that Darlan did not 
represent democratic virtues. To the Daily Tribune, any 
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stigma that may arise from treating with the enemy, in this 
instance, was outweighed by a higher moral position. 
If General Eisenhower had not taken advantage of 
the opportunity presented to him he would have 
been grossly derelict in his duty to his men and a 
lot of American mothers and fathers today would be 
mourning the loss of their sons. 11269 
A letter to the Chicago Sun on November 21 praised the 
newspaper for its stand against Darlan. The writer, who 
only identified himself as "Simple Simon," claimed that by 
supporting "slimy opportunists and turncoats like Darlan," 
the United States had turned its back on De Gaulle and Free 
French, the only French group to continue the fight against 
Hitler. "Now they are being superseded by eleventh-hour 
converts who are more interested in getting on the winning 
side than in serving their country. La bas Darlan. Vive De 
Gaulle. " 270 
In his November 21 "Steel Filings" column, Johannes Steel 
warned that it now appeared that many fascists had been 
trying to contact Allied authorities since the Darlan 
incident. To support this claim he pointed to an Associated 
Press report from London claiming that German generals were 
sending out feelers concerning a strong, de-Nazified Germany 
as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the New 
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York Times reported an unidentified Washington source as 
saying that "If Goering should offer to come over with a few 
planes, we don't want him. He will cost more than he will 
contribute. But it he can bring the Luftwaffe with him 
we'll receive him." Steel wanted to know if this was an 
invitation. 271 
Steel argues that these events and quotes provide 
evidence that Axis leaders now wondered about the Allies' 
moral fortitude. If a deal can be struck with Darlan, why 
not Hitler's own military forces? The only way to combat 
this is to publicly refuse any peace with the German General 
Staff; 272 to again state the Allied comrni tment to the 
absolute destruction of Naziism and it origins. 
In fact, the German General Staff is even more 
dangerous than Hitler since it is not always 
recognized that Pan-German imperialism and 
Prussian militarism were precisely the anti-
democratic seeds that germinated into the weed of 
National Socialism. 273 
Samuel Grafton, in his "I'd Rather Be Right" column of 
November 21, also warned that the Allies had begun receiving 
contacts from fascists. Grafton pointed out that many of 
these people were Vichyites fleeing France to join up with 
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Darlan in Africa, but Grafton was more worried about what to 
do with fascists once the Allies had them, than what to do 
about negotiating with them. 274 
We've talked about setting up a commission to try 
fascists, after the war, but our idea is to try 
them for derivative, or secondary crimes, not for 
the big crime of fascism. If M. Laval has never 
committed a murder, he would get off, though he 
helped to kill a country. 275 
Grafton said a commission didn't work at the end of world 
war I. Why try a commission again when it didn't work the 
first time? The columnist's proposal was to let the people 
of each liberated country decide the fate of their fascist 
citizens. "The moral strength that will free Europe from 
within will render fascism harmless, and our moral fortitude 
will not lie in interfering. 11276 
Grafton and Steel's columns mark a turning point in the 
discussion of Darlan. Increasingly, the press became 
interested in what conditions must be met for Darlan's 
removal. But the media also began discussing the larger 
moral issues of how to deal with other Darlans. As the war 
progressed, there would surely be other fascists willing to 
switch sides. Even if they didn't switch sides, what did 
274Sarnuel Grafton, "I'd Rather Be Right," The New York 
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the Allies propose to do with captured fascists? The Darlan 
discussion had evolved into the larger moral issue of how to 
deal with fascists so that the Allies' moral authority would 
not be compromised, at least in the United States. 
The Allied Reaction to Roosevelt's statement 
Roosevelt's statement clearly helped calm the American 
public. Although American papers continued to denigrate 
Darlan, they now expressed support for the Darlan Deal for 
purely military reasons. In the United Kingdom, however, 
strong and vocal criticism continued. 
In Parliament, Thomas Horabin attacked the President's 
statement the very day it was delivered. Horabin claimed 
that his constituents were bewildered to see the Allies 
embrace "one of Hitler's most hated satellites." 277 He asked 
how much more bewildered the people of France must be to see 
Britain support one of their betrayers. Horabin said 
Roosevelt's statement did nothing to encourage the captive 
people of Europe, "because the oppressed peoples no longer 
trust words. "278 The Allies needed to re-examine their 
principles. If the Allied nations continue to support 
277 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), col. 446. 
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fascists instead of men who represent freedom, "I suggest 
that that way lies disaster for us, " he said. 279 
128 
On November 21, the Manchester Guardian, in its editorial 
"A New Phase" discussed the feelings of Members of 
Parliament on a variety of issues, touched on Roosevelt's 
statement on the Darlan issue. "On the recognition of 
Darlan feelings ran deep ... The House of Commons, like the 
rest of the country, dislikes the agreement with Darlan. It 
is only barely satisfied with President Roosevelt's 
assurance of its temporary character. "280 
Further evidence of the British public's attitude 
appeared on November 23 when a letter to the editor appeared 
in the Manchester Guardian responding to the paper's Nov. 18 
editorial, "The Darlan Mystery." The letter takes the paper 
to task for equating Darlan with Laval. Laval had become a 
fascist long before 1939 and thus could only be regarded as 
an enemy. 281 
The case of Darlan is very different. He was the 
commander-in-chief of a Navy which had been 
fighting as our ally for nine months. In a moment 
of our gravest danger he gave the order 
withdrawing the support of the French Fleet. 
Later, he was solely responsible for withholding 
from that fleet the knowledge of the very generous 
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terms offered by us for its neutralisation, 
thereby causing those lamentable events which 
enabled the enemy to drive such a formidable wedge 
between the French and English nations. 282 
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To the writer, Darlan was worse than an enemy, he was a 
traitor to the Allied cause. In 1940, he sought to 
accommodate the enemy and dismissed any thought of 
continuing the war. In war fought for ideological reasons, 
this meant that Darlan was willing to abandon traditional 
French and British ideals for those of the enemy. It was 
too much to expect the admiral to now embrace the beliefs 
for which the Allies fought. 
The Guardian again attacked Darlan on November 24 in the 
editorial "Amnesty." The paper took exception to an amnesty 
announced by the French North African Commission, the body 
headed by Darlan, for all persons who had sided with the 
Allies during the American invasion. To the newspaper, it 
would have been a greater crime not to support the Allied 
action in North Africa. The fight against the Axis was to 
defend a way of life; it was a matter of conscience. 
We are apparently to understand that those 
Frenchmen who supported us committed a crime for 
which they needed to be pardoned. Perhaps we 
shall ask Darlan to secure a pardon for General de 
Gaulle for the crime of coming to Britain to raise 
282 Ibid. 
a French army to support us, a crime for which the 
Vichy Government sentenced him to death. 283 
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On November 26, a motion condemning the Darlan agreement 
was introduced into the House of Commons. 
This House is of the opinion that our relations 
with Admiral Darlan and his kind are inconsistent 
with the ideals for which we entered and are 
fighting this war; furthermore, that these 
relations, if persisted in, will undermine the 
faith in us among our friends in the oppressed and 
invaded nations and impair the military, social 
and political prospects of the final and complete 
triumph of the cause of the United Nations. 284 
The threat of this motion proved so real that Prime 
Minister Churchill read President Roosevelt's statement to 
the House of Commons. Although the President's statement 
succeeded in killing the motion, debate and argument 
concerning the Darlan Deal continued. 285 
The Russian people, too, seemed shocked by the Darlan 
Deal, except for the most important Russian. Stalin fully 
understood the advantages of the Darlan Agreement and 
congratulated the British and Americans for taking advantage 
of the opportunity the French admiral provided. 286 In his 
November 28 letter to Churchill, Stalin directly replied to 
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Churchill's November 24 comments on Darlan, "It seems to me 
that the Americans used Darlan not badly in order to 
facilitate the occupation of the Northern and Western 
Africa. The military diplomacy must be able to use for 
military purposes not only Darlan but 'Even the Devil 
himself and his grandma' [Stalin quoted from a Russian 
proverb] . "287 
Churchill forwarded Stalin's message to Roosevelt, 
notifying the President of Stalin's acceptance of the 
deal. 288 Stalin later shared his view of the Darlan Deal 
with the President personally. In a December 14 letter to 
Roosevelt, the Soviet leader said he felt Eisenhower's 
agreement with Darlan was sound military policy. "I 
consider it an important achievement that you have succeeded 
in winning Darlan and others to the Allied side against 
Hitler, " Stalin wrote. 289 
But one other party also had problems with the 
President's statement: Darlan. In a letter to General 
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Clark, Darlan complained that "Information from various 
sources tends to substantiate the view that I am 'only a 
lemon which the Americans will drop after they have squeezed 
it dry.' " 290 
290Langer, 3 7 3 . 
CHAPTER VI 
DARLAN'S FINAL DAYS 
Darlan was not quite ready to be "squeezed dry." 
133 
Throughout late November and early December, Darlan acted 
increasingly like a head of state. In fact, General 
Eisenhower learned on December 3 that Darlan was prepared to 
declare himself head of state (since Petain had become a 
prisoner of the Germans) and form an Imperial Council, 
composed of his top officials, to administer French North 
Africa. 291 This announcement proved potentially embarrassing 
since it directly violated Roosevelt's policy of non-
recognition of a French Government until after the war. 
Eisenhower ordered a stop to the announcement. 292 
Eisenhower explained to Darlan that the U.S. could not 
be seen recognizing any provisional French government. The 
U.S. only regarded Darlan as the head of a local 
administration and not as the French head of state. 293 
Darlan got permission to create and head his Imperial 
Council, but he had to publish the statement as a "joint 
announcement" and to omit "French Imperial Federation" in an 
291 Ibid., 376. 
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attempt to derive the announcement of any official 
character. 294 Darlan' s final statement read: 
An event of far-reaching importance has taken 
place: French Africa has been given the official 
structure which will enable it, pending the 
liberation of Metropolitan France, to defend the 
general interests of the Empire, to resume in an 
effective way the fight on the side of her allies, 
and to represent France in the world .... 
The High Commissioner, representing French 
sovereignty, and assisted by the services of the 
High Commissariat, will henceforth assume the 
rights and responsibilities of a government in 
every country concerned .... At the side of the 
High Commissioner, who represents the French 
State, the Imperial Council will, from now on, 
represent the various territories of the 
Empire ... 295 
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Despite Eisenhower's attempts to water down Darlan's 
statement, the public immediately reacted to the admiral's 
broadcast. In Great Britain, the public outcry caused 
Members of Parliament to give voice to their constituents' 
feelings. Many questions were raised against in Parliament 
about the Allies' policy toward Darlan. The Government's 
statement did its best to distance itself from the French 
admiral's announcement: 
Lieut-Col. Elliot asked for an assurance that his 
Majesty's Government were in no way committed by 
the proclamation made by Admiral Darlan that he 
294Ibid., 376. 
295
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was assuming responsibility as head of the 
Government of Northern Africa. 
Mr. Eden-Yes, Sir. His Majesty's Government were 
in no way consulted about that statement, and do 
not consider themselves in any way bound by it. 
(Cheers.) .... 
Mr. Shinwell- The right hon. gentleman has said 
that His Majesty's Government were not committed 
to Admiral Darlan's proclamation. Who is 
committed to it? Is it some other Government? 
Are we to understand that Admiral Darlan is 
himself responsible and no other Government 
associated with the united Nations? 
Mr. Eden-So far as I know it was a unilateral 
inspiration of Admiral Darlan himself. 
(Laughter.) 296 
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The London Times reassured the public that Darlan's 
claims to political leadership in North Africa were the 
admiral's own invention in its December 7 editorial, 
"Admiral Darlan's Status." In it, the Times told readers 
that General Eisenhower "did not do, did not seek to do, and 
was not entitled to do" confer a permanent political status 
on Darlan. The only way that political power can be re-
established in any French territory is through free 
elections as stated in the Atlantic Charter. 297 
The issue here is of far reaching importance. The 
eventual re-establishment of regular organs of 
government in the countries liberated from the 
Nazi terror will obviously raise problems of the 
296
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utmost delicacy and complexity. But it is clear 
that the decisive voice must come from the peoples 
of the countries concerned. 298 
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A poll conducted by the British Institute of Public 
Opinion provided further evidence of the British public's 
disapproval of the Darlan Deal. The survey indicated that 
51 percent of those polled disapproved of Darlan becoming 
head of the French North African government. Only 18 
percent on the British public expressed approval. 299 
Across the Atlantic, the Christian Science Monitor, in 
its December 8 editorial "America in Africa" asked whether 
Darlan was using the United States to achieve his own ends. 
The paper argued that Darlan had only limited use to the 
Allies, despite what generals in North Africa might claim. 
America should use all its power to remove or discredit 
Darlan before he gathered too much power. Not to do so 
threatened to break faith with the Allied public, as well as 
the citizens of Europe. 
Aside from the practical aspects of the problem 
and danger of destroying the hopes and enthusiasm 
of the French who are disturbed by the apparent 
rewarding of a man who helped Hitler, there is the 
298 Ibid. 
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necessity for the Allies to keep faith with their 
own ideals and principles. 300 
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The Monitor even suggested that the U.S. administer 
food distribution in North Africa. Removing that 
responsibility from Darlan would weaken his authority 
significantly. "But certainly there should be a limit to 
the 'temporary expedient' and the firmest resistance to 
Darlan's apparent effort to cement his position by use of 
American power. 11301 In other words, remove Darlan before he 
caused any more ethical problems for the Allies. 
On December 16, another letter to the editor that 
condemned Darlan appeared in the New York Post. The writer, 
Lynn Forest, argued that it was well past time for Darlan to 
be removed from power in North Africa. Retaining him not 
only hurt relations with Allies, but also went against the 
very principles for which the United States had been 
founded. 
Dear Editor: Our military gains in North Africa 
may be obliterated by the grave harm being done 
to the cause of human freedom by our continued 
acceptance of Darlan. 
Darlan Pro-fascist, Vichy mock ruler, 
collaborator with the Nazi hordes that stripped 
and tortured France! While at the time a deal 
with Darlan saved lives, his usefulness is over, 
and there is no answer we can make to the 
300
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sickened, angry people, who, with the Fighting 
French, have starved, suffered and died to wipe 
out the shame of a defeat that was not theirs, 
but the defeat of men like Darlan .... Americans 
tired of tyrants almost two centuries ago. Have 
we forgotten ?302 
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A letter in the December 19 issue of the New York Post 
claimed the Darlan Deal had eliminated any moral reason for 
the war. The author, Joshua Right, argued that Allied war 
leaders should not be trusted; the slogans they used to 
justify the war had been proved false by the Darlan Deal. 
Instead of placing fascists on trial, we "give them the 
opportunity to proclaim themselves 'Chief of State,' 'Chief 
of the Empire' and other titles of Fascistic coinage. 11303 
No, we don't believe in these slogans, as long as 
our commanding officers will deal with traitors, 
a la Darlan, who rightly belong on the scaffold. 
Together with the Fighting French we repeat "What 
are we fighting for?" Certainly not Darlan and 
his clique. 304 
As late as December 23, editorials and letters still 
appeared in newspapers attacking Darlan and his political 
establishment in North Africa. The New York Post warned 
that until the Americans finally disposed of Darlan, the 
U.S. would never live up to its stated war aims. It based 
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its argument on three points: that Darlan had nothing left 
to offer the Allies, that the Darlan situation had strained 
relations between the U.S. and its British and Free French 
allies, and that the Darlan Deal has badly hurt American 
public moral. 305 
Instead of just dropping Darlan, the paper argued, the 
U.S. played a "diplomatic Alice in Wonderland game," holding 
relations with Darlan as if he were a sovereign ruler. The 
American government tried to obscure the issue by calling 
Darlan a high commissioner instead of head of state and 
calling our ambassador to Darlan a "civil affairs 
officer. 11306 
Ever since Hitler rose to power, the way to make 
sure of having to give fascism a lot has been to 
try to deal with it cheap. Isn't the Darlan case 
another incredible example of this truism. 307 
In the same issue of the Post, another contributor 
expressed his opinion that retaining Darlan was morally 
wrong. In his letter to the editor, Morel J. Fuchs argued 
that Darlan was a fascist and therefore the enemy. 
Accepting Darlan for temporary military gain proved to be a 
305
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lie since he failed to bring the French fleet over to the 
Allied side. 
We are fighting for our way of life and the 
continuance of our existence as a great nation. 
Would it therefore not be proper at this time to 
let our Allies and the enslaved people of the 
world know that their enemies are our enemies and 
their friends ours? 
It is my opinion that Monsieur Darlan ... should be 
treated like a prisoner of war, no better nor 
worse. 308 
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Darlan's reign as political chief of French North 
Africa did not last long, however. At 2:30 p.m. on a sunny 
Christmas Eve in Algiers, a young man in his 20s arrived at 
the southern gate of the Palais d' Ete, the headquarters of 
the Imperial Council. He walked to the nearby Moorish 
pavilion, which housed the offices of the High Commissariat 
and signed the registry. A guard admitted the man into the 
waiting room where he smoked a cigarette. 309 
Shortly after 3 p.m., a car containing Admiral Darlan 
drove into the compound. Darlan and his aide, Captain 
Hourcade, promptly proceeded to the Admiral's office. As 
Darlan passed the waiting room on the way to his office, the 
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The New York Post, 23 December 1942, 23. 
309Tompkins, 185-186. 
141 
young man drew a gun and shot him twice. Darlan collapsed 
in his off ice doorway. 310 
Hourcade grabbed the man about the throat and wrist. 
As the man tried to free himself from Hourcade's grip, the 
gun went off again, grazing the Captain's cheek. Hourcade 
released the man and the assassin took aim at Hourcade's 
stomach and fired. Hourcade tried to Jump out of the 
bullet's path, but the bullet entered his thigh. 311 
By this time several guards had arrived in the waiting 
room. As the assassin attempted to flee through a window, 
one guard grabbed the assassin while another guard used a 
chair to knock the gun out of his hand. 312 
While the guards struggled with the assassin, three of 
Darlan's administrators emerged from the nearby offices to 
tend to the Admiral. Darlan lay with his eyes open, 
bleeding from the mouth. 313 A rear admiral and a sailor 
carried Darlan to a car and drove him to the hospital which 
was treating his son, Alain. 314 Darlan was conscious 
throughout the drive, but unable to speak due to his wounds. 
Twenty minutes later, at the hospital, a surgeon pronounced 
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him dead. The bullets had punctured his liver and 
intestines. 
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When the news of Darlan's assassination reached the 
United States, the press overwhelming condemned the murder. 
The Allied cause was not about eliminating political 
opponents but about restoring political pluralism. For all 
their criticism of the Darlan Deal and abuse of Admiral 
Darlan himself, most newspapers claimed the assassination 
solved nothing. Yet they saw in Darlan's death an 
opportunity to unite the various French factions on the 
Allied side and any Vichy remnants. 
The Washington Post expressed this exact sentiment on 
December 26. In the editorial "Exit Darlan," the Post 
assured readers that despite Darlan's switch to the Allied 
side, his administration in North Africa continued Vichy 
policies. For instance, the paper said, Darlan eased 
censorship rules and restrictions on communication only 
shortly before his death, and probably at Eisenhower's 
insistence. However, the Post said, the removal of this 
fascist-leaning Frenchmen provides an opportunity: 
The assassination of Darlan removes a man with 
whom the kind of Frenchmen who never lost their 
faith in France could not collaborate. But on the 
council in North Africa, there are many Frenchmen 
who believe in France, who would die for her, who 
have given many sacrifices in her behalf. These 
are the sort of men who might-and could-hoist a 
French standard which would be worthy in the sight 
of the free world and of the Free French. There 
was no such standard in North Africa when Darlan 
was high commissioner. 315 
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The Christian Science Monitor expressed similar 
beliefs. In the paper's December 26 editorial, "Darlan-Not 
a Solution," the Christian Science Monitor argued that the 
most pressing problem caused by the Darlan murder was the 
choice of successor. When Darlan lived, he claimed to 
derive his authority from Marshall Petain, which forced many 
"loyal but legal-minded French officers" from supporting 
other French leaders. After Darlan's assassination, the 
paper said, two or three Frenchmen existed who could become 
his legitimate successor. The choice of successor provides 
"a new opportunity to work out solutions of internal 
differences which were bound to exist until the nature of 
Darlan' s role could be ascertained. 11316 
The New York Times also stressed French unity in its 
December 26 editorial. In "The End of Darlan," the Times 
provided readers with a brief biography of Darlan's life and 
the rationales behind the Darlan Deal. Chiefly, that only 
Darlan had the authority to order an end to French 
resistance to the Allied landings. Darlan's death raised 
the problem of who could claim that authority. 
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What is most important is to secure the French 
leadership most likely to be accepted, most likely 
to make for unity rather than division in the 
French North African civil population and armed 
forces. 317 
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On December 27, an editorial cartoon, titled "Smoke 
from a Little Pistol," (see Figure 1) appeared in the 
Baltimore Sun. 318 Like the editorials from the previous 
days, it too expressed concern that Darlan's assassination 
would create a power struggle in North Africa for the 
leadership of the anti-Axis French movement. 
Figure 1: Smoke from a Little Pistol 
. ·smoke Prom A Little Pistol 
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These issues of succession were, in fact, being 
considered in North Africa. If another Vichyite was 
selected to lead the Imperial Council, the Americans would 
again be accused of supporting a pro-fascist government and 
cutting deals with the enemy. Darlan's Deputy High 
Commissioner had been General Jean Marie Bergeret. Bergeret 
produced an ordinance, dated December 2, in which Darlan had 
named General Nogues his successor should the admiral be 
temporarily incapacitated. Should Darlan be unable to serve 
as High Commissioner, the Imperial Council was to meet and 
elect a successor. 319 
In an effort to determine the mood of the Imperial 
Council, Murphy visited Bergeret on Christmas Day and 
discovered that the Deputy High Commissioner favored Nogues. 
Murphy told Bergeret that the American public would oppose 
Nogues. "Giraud is very popular in the United States," 
Murphy said. 320 
At this point, Giraud had no knowledge of the American 
efforts on his behalf; he had been leading the French forces 
in Tunisia. When he arrived back in Algiers for the meeting 
of the Imperial Council, he was immediately summoned to meet 
with General Clark. At that meeting, Clark informed Giraud 
that Eisenhower "considered it necessary that he immediately 
319Langer, 379-380. 
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take over the functions of High Commissioner. "321 Although 
Giraud at first claimed that he only wanted a military 
command, he quickly changed his mind. At noon on December 
26, the Imperial Council met and unanimously elected Giraud 
High Commissioner. 
As High Commissioner, Giraud inherited the task of 
investigating Darlan's murder. The assassin, it was soon 
discovered was a 20-year old French royalist named Bonnier 
de la Chapelle. 322 De la Chapelle was involved with an anti-
Nazi group of five other young Frenchmen that a Free French 
organizer had helped form in Algiers. 323 
The group originally planned to assassinate Darlan 
while in his car. A car driven by one of the French 
conspirators would take out Darlan's motorcycle escort. 
Another car would drive up beside Darlan's car and spray the 
car with gunfire. The plan was dropped because it involved 
too many people, and it was decided to send someone to 
Darlan's office and assassinate him there. The four 
Royalists then drew lots to determine which one of them 
would perform the murder. De la Chapelle won the drawing. 324 
After the assassination, the Count of Paris, the 
pretender to the French throne, arrived to speak with 
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General Giraud. The Count proposed his own nomination as 
head of the Imperial Council on the grounds that he might 
bring French unity. Giraud refused to forward the Count's 
nomination. Soon afterwards, the Count returned to his home 
in Spanish Morocco. The Royalist plot had failed. 325 
This placed de la Chapelle in a dangerous position. 
Although he expected to become a national hero, Giraud had 
him executed by a firing squad two days after the 
assassination. 326 Clearly, de la Chapelle expected to be 
saved as he talked to the police about his plans to pursue a 
diplomatic career. De la Chapelle had told police that he 
had acted alone in the assassination plot. When the plot to 
bring about a de facto restoration of the French monarchy 
had failed, de la Chapelle had became a liability. No 
sympathetic Frenchmen or fellow royalist conspirator dared 
step forward to save the man's life. 327 
Even so, the police arrested 14 men in connection with 
the assassination plot. Many of those arrested had been 
among the pro-Allied sympathizers who helped the U.S. 
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landing forces come ashore on November 8. 328 Four of the men 
arrested were high North African officials appointed by 
Darlan. Their charges included neglect and plotting to 
establish a new French government. These arrests proved to 
an attempt by pro-Vichy authorities to round up the major 
Allied sympathizers in Algiers. Eventually all were 
cleared. 
328Ibid., 147-149. 
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On the evening of January 14, 1943, a C-54 transport 
plane carrying President Roosevelt landed at the Casablanca 
airfield. Casablanca had been chosen as the scene for the 
next meeting of the leaders of the Allied movement. 
Roosevelt had come there ostensively to meet with Churchill 
(who had arrived on January 12) in order to plan the next 
stages of the war. 329 ( Stalin did not travel to the 
conference, arguing that he could not leave his headquarters 
for even a few days. ) 330 In reality, Roosevelt planned to 
use the conference to deal with another issue. Although 
Darlan had died in December, the issues which he had come to 
symbolize persisted. 
If the Americans might make a deal with Darlan, who had 
served as prime minister in the fascist Vichy government, 
might the Americans also try to deal with the King of Italy, 
who had sanctioned Benito Mussolini's fascist government for 
twenty years? Would the Allies be open to receiving more 
turncoat fascists? Could these men survive to play a role 
in post-war European governments? Where better to deal with 
329Kimball, 117. 
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these issues than in North Africa, where the entire Darlan 
controversy first arose. 
The Casablanca Conference also seemed an ideal 
opportunity to end the feuding between the various French 
factions which had formed after the Darlan Deal. This would 
help quiet those critics who claimed that the deal 
essentially provided recognition of a fascist group at the 
expense of friendly and anti-fascist Free French movement. 
Darlan's assassination and Giraud's ascension as his 
successor now made a solution to this criticism look 
possible. 
As previously noted, Giraud was well liked in the 
United States. He had a long record of fighting the 
Germans; he had refused any position in the Vichy 
government; and he had assisted the United States action in 
North Africa. Although he had cooperated in Darlan's North 
Africa government and succeeded Darlan as its head, Giraud's 
previous record allowed him to escape any fascist taint. 
Roosevelt could use Giraud's ascension as High Commissioner 
in North Africa, as opposed to an overt Vichy figure, as 
evidence of the United States' commitment to defeating 
fascism. A reconciliation between General de Gaulle's Free 
French movement and Giraud's North African administration 
could provide further evidence of that commitment. 
However, Giraud and de Gaulle's meeting at Casablanca 
proved a spectacular failure. Nobody came away from the 
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Casablanca Conference believing that a unified French 
resistance was about to be formed. Giraud had come to 
Casablanca expecting that he would leave as the leader of 
the Free French. De Gaulle had come to Casablanca only 
after Churchill had threatened to withdraw British funding 
for the Free French. 331 Once at Casablanca, de Gaulle 
insisted that the Free French represented all of France 
while Giraud only represented the brand of fascism embraced 
by Darlan. 332 Although Roosevelt and Churchill attempted to 
get the two to form a unified command structure, neither 
French general was willing to grant anything to the other. 333 
The animosity between the two men was obvious at a joint 
British-American press conference on January 24. The two 
French generals agreed to shake hands, but neither man 
appeared happy. 334 
The discord between the various French camps failed to 
reassure the American public that the Darlan Deal had not 
been made at the sacrifice of our allies. If Roosevelt and 
Churchill intended to bury Darlan once and for all, that 
also meant that they had to state that no more deals with 
former enemy agents would be made. Roosevelt made this 
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statement soon after the two bickering French generals had 
left the press conference. 
Peace can come to the world only by the total 
elimination of German and Japanese war power ... 
The elimination of German, Japanese, and Italian 
war power means the unconditional surrender by 
Germany, Italy, and Japan. That means a 
reasonable assurance of future world peace. It 
does not mean the destruction of the population of 
Germany, Italy, and Japan, but it does mean the 
destruction of the philosophies in those countries 
which are based on conquest and the subjugation of 
other people. 335 
The unconditional surrender doctrine had a history 
independent of the Darlan affair. In fact, discussions on 
unconditional surrender had begun after the Americans 
entered the war. The U.S. State Department's Subcommittee 
on Security Problems considered unconditional surrender as 
early as April, 1942. The subcommittee-composed of members 
of the State, Army, and Navy-claimed that the U.S. was only 
at war because Germans believed their armed forces had been 
betrayed by the German political leaders at the end of World 
War I. The subcommittee recommended "On the assumption that 
the victory of the United Nations will be conclusive, 
unconditional surrender rather than an armistice should be 
sought from the principal enemy states except perhaps 
Italy. u336 
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The subcommittee's chair, Norman Davis, who had 
previously served as an ambassador-at-large and was good 
friends with Secretary of State Hull, brought the 
subcommittee's findings to the President. 337 Churchill, in 
turn, was told of Roosevelt's support of the policy by 
August 1942, months before the North African landings. 338 
The President clearly committed himself to the unconditional 
surrender policy. On December 2, 1942, Roosevelt told 
General Wladislaw Sikorski, head of the Polish government-
in-exile, that "We have no intention of concluding this war 
with any kind of armistice or treaty. Germany must 
surrender unconditionally. 11339 
Yet despite the long-term consideration of the 
unconditional surrender policy, Churchill claimed he was 
surprised by Roosevelt's statement. Clearly the Prime 
Minister's surprise could not have been over the 
announcement of such a policy because the two men had 
discussed the issue during the conference. 340 Roosevelt had 
told Churchill that he favored such policy and was thinking 
of making a public statement. Churchill, for his part, sent 
a message to his war Cabinet: 
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We propose to draw up a statement of the work of 
the conference for communication to the press at 
the proper time. I should be glad to know what 
the war Cabinet would think of our including in 
this statement a declaration of the firm intention 
of the United States and the British Empire to 
continue the war relentlessly until we have 
brought about the "unconditional surrender" of 
Germany and Japan. The omission of Italy would be 
to encourage a break-up there. 341 
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The War Cabinet responded favorably to the policy, but 
asked that Italy be included under the policy. However, 
Churchill and Roosevelt did not return to the topic after 
their initial discussion. Neither man brought up the issue 
when reviewing the contents of the joint statement intended 
for release at the end of the conference. 342 
So why was Churchill surprised by Roosevelt's 
announcement of the unconditional surrender pledge? The 
Prime Minister had known of the American's preference for 
the policy for months. Only a short time before, the 
President had told Churchill that he was thinking of 
publicly discussing the policy. But the details of the 
unconditional surrender policy had yet to be formalized. 
Churchill had yet to inform Roosevelt of the British 
Government's opinion nor had the President sought out the 
British response. Churchill must have thought the matter 
would be taken up at some latter date. 
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So the real question becomes not why the unconditional 
surrender policy was formed, but why did Roosevelt choose to 
make a public statement at the time he did. Clearly, 
Roosevelt wished to reassure Stalin and the Soviet Union 
that the United States and the United Kingdom intended to 
remain in the war until its end, especially since it was now 
clear that the Western Allies would not attempt to open a 
second front in Europe in 1943. 343 Earlier in the 
conference, Marshall had argued against a major operation in 
Europe, preferring to put off any full-scale invasion until 
1944, but he supported Eisenhower's proposal to invade 
Sicily or Sardinia once the Germans and Italians in Tunisia 
had been defeated. Churchill also advocated an invasion of 
Italy, feeling that only a move into Europe could pacify the 
soviets. 344 
Immediately after the Casablanca Conference, Roosevelt 
sent Marshall to Moscow in order to discuss the delay in 
opening a second front with Stalin. Roosevelt wanted to 
reassure Stalin that the Western Allies had no intention of 
reaching a type of "Darlan Agreement" with pro-fascist, 
German elements that would allow the Germans to continue to 
wage war against the Russians. 345 
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Bearing these factors in mind, Roosevelt may have made 
the unconditional surrender pledge as a way to reassure the 
Soviets that the United States and the United Kingdom were 
committed to the war. But as already noted, Stalin 
recognized the strategic advantage of using Darlan and 
didn't see Eisenhower's agreement with the French Admiral as 
hurting the Soviet position. Moreover, Stalin had stated 
this exact position to both Roosevelt and Churchill. The 
President had little reason to think that Stalin had 
misinterpreted the reasons for the Darlan Agreement. 
Roosevelt no doubt understood the foreign policy advantages 
of the unconditional surrender policy, but the statement had 
stronger domestic advantages. 
The public commentary on the Darlan Deal had continued 
for over three months in both the United States and the 
United Kingdom. While the American public may have 
eventually accepted the Darlan Deal for its strategic 
reasons of saving lives and saving time, it was clear that 
many felt it violated the spirit of the Four Freedoms speech 
and the Atlantic Charter. By demanding unconditional 
surrender, Roosevelt was able to reclaim the moral high 
ground. 
It may have been the President's desire to restore the 
moral justification for the war that led him to leave 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull in Washington. When 
Churchill suggested bringing Anthony Eden, the British 
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Foreign Secretary, with him to Casablanca, Roosevelt 
objected because he didn't want to bring Hull. The 
Secretary of State had rigid ideas and would be a nuisance 
Roosevelt said. Specifically, Hull opposed unconditional 
surrender and was closely identified with the Darlan Deal. 
Hull's presence at Casablanca would have made Darlan 
transparent. 346 
In fact, Roosevelt linked his decision to announce the 
unconditional surrender pledge with Darlan and the North 
African political situation on several occasions, albeit 
indirectly. Once, when recalling the announcement, the 
President said: 
We had so much trouble getting those two French 
generals together [de Gaulle and Giraud] that I 
thought to myself that this was as difficult as 
arranging the meeting of Grant and Lee-and then 
suddenly the press conference was on, and Winston 
and I had no time to prepare for it, and the 
thought popped into my mind that they had called 
Grant 'Old Unconditional Surrender' and the next 
thing I knew, I had said it. 3n 
The meeting between de Gaulle and Giraud represented 
the first meeting of the Free French and Darlanist French 
elements. The unconditional surrender doctrine helped 
prevent future agreements like the one which created 
competing French organizations in the Allied camp. It did 
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this by establishing three main points. These points 
included developing "confidence and a sense of solidarity 
among the united Nations," making it clear that no 
compromise peace with the Nazis would take place, and 
refusing to accept any post-war fascist regime. 348 
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These points, as embodied in the unconditional 
surrender policy, directly dealt with the major public 
concerns that came out of the Darlan Deal. By encouraging a 
sense of solidarity among the Allies, Roosevelt dealt with 
the criticism that the United States had abandoned the 
Fighting French by entering into the Darlan Deal. The 
announcement of unconditional surrender reiterated the 
Allies' commitment to defeating fascism. 
The President discussed this point and linked it to the 
Darlan Deal in his February 12, 1943 radio address about the 
Casablanca Conference. Roosevelt cautioned that Axis 
propaganda sought to divide the united Nations by claiming 
that the Soviet union, the United Kingdom, the united 
States, and China would all go to war against one another 
after Germany was defeated. 
This is their [the Axis nations] final effort to 
turn one nation against another, in the vain hope 
that they may settle with one or two at a 
time-that any of us may be so gullible and so 
348Clayton D. Laurie, The Propaganda warriors: 
America's Crusade Against Nazi Germany (Lawrence, Kansas: 
University Press of Kansas, 1996), 160. 
forgetful as to be duped into making "deals" at 
the expense of our Allies. 349 
159 
Besides reassuring the public that there would be no 
more Darlan Deals, Roosevelt also strengthened the position 
of his British ally. Darlan's position in North Africa had 
created an even greater uproar in Great Britain than in the 
United States. Not only was the deal criticized in the 
British press, but also in Parliament. Churchill was forced 
to give several statements in the House of Commons in secret 
session. It was clear from these sessions that sentiment in 
the Commons opposed the Darlan Deal. If Churchill came 
under severe criticism for one Darlan Deal another might 
threaten his position as prime minister. Churchill's 
predecessor had been forced from office shortly before the 
fall of France. By making the unconditional surrender 
pledge, Roosevelt established policy that prevented any 
future deals with men of Darlan's ilk. 
By rejecting any compromise peace, the President dealt 
with the fear that the United States might be willing to 
deal with Hitler and Mussolini as it had dealt with Darlan. 
This fear had its roots in the Americans' world War I 
experiences. At the end of World war I certain segments of 
the American public argued that Germany should be forced to 
349Franklin Roosevelt, "Radio Address," 
<http://msstate.edu/Archives/History/USA/WWII/casablan.txt>, 
12 February 1943. 
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surrender. The adherents of this position included General 
George Pershing, head of the World war I American forces in 
Europe, and Congressional Republicans. Despite this 
sentiment, President Wilson's administration, which included 
Roosevelt, joined an armistice with Germany. 350 
The lack of a German surrender helped create the belief 
that the German army had never been defeated. Instead, the 
German army had been stabbed in the back by the new 
democratic German government that had come into being after 
the war. Hitler and Nazis had used this belief to discredit 
democratic institutions, argue that the post-war settlement 
had unfairly singled out Germany, and rebuild the German 
military. 351 
To the American public, the Darlan Deal raised the 
shadow of the World War I Armistice. Instead of forcing the 
enemy to acknowledge its defeat and discredit its 
institutions, the Allies seemed to be creating a formula for 
the fascism to survive the war and pose a future threat. 
Roosevelt wanted to avoid this at all costs. 
Roosevelt's third objective was the total elimination 
of Nazism. Since fascism was presented as the moral 
opposite of democracy, some sort of reckoning had to take 
place. A complete battlefield defeat would help discredit 
350weinberg, A world At Arms, 438-439. 
351 Ibid. , 43 9. 
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Nazi and fascism philosophies but, as Roosevelt stated in 
his February 12 radio address, he wanted to ensure that the 
fascist humiliation ran so deep that democratic governments 
replaced fascist regimes: 
In our uncompromising policy we mean no harm to 
the common people of the Axis nations. But we do 
mean to impose punishment and retribution in full 
upon their guilty, barbaric leaders ... 
In the years of the American and French 
revolutions the fundamental principle guiding our 
democracies was established. The cornerstone of 
our whole democratic edifice was the principle 
that from the people and the people alone flows 
the authority of government. 
It is one of our war aims, as expressed in the 
Atlantic Charter, that the conquered populations 
of today be again the masters of their destiny. 
There must be no doubt anywhere that it is the 
unalterable purpose of the United Nations to 
restore to conquered peoples their sacred 
rights. 352 
With the announcement of the unconditional surrender 
pledge, the Western Allies were able to put the Darlan Deal 
behind them. Although Roosevelt did not expect the public 
outcry which resulted from Eisenhower's agreement with 
Darlan, it was a predictable consequence of the President's 
statements depicting World War II as a moral struggle. To 
gain public support for his pro-Allied policies, Roosevelt 
had expressed American foreign policy in terms of the Four 
Freedoms speech and the Atlantic Charter. These documents 
352Roosevelt, "Radio Address." 
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claimed that the fascist philosophy constituted a direct 
threat to the American lifestyle and committed the United 
States to restoring democratic governments and human rights 
to nations ruled by fascist governments. 
When General Eisenhower agreed to recognize Admiral 
Darlan's authority in French North Africa, it seemed that 
the United States' previous statements of policy and the 
moral imperative of the war had been abandoned. Instead of 
fighting to eliminate fascism, the United States was 
allowing the Vichy fascist government to retain its power in 
American occupied territory with a fascist cabinet member 
(Darlan) at its head. 
The public's outrage over this situation expressed 
itself in newspaper editorials, letters to the editor, and 
statements of opposition in national legislatures. Several 
times the President attempted to quiet the national outrage. 
However, only the unconditional surrender pledge directly 
addressed the issues raised by the Darlan Deal and restored 
the moral principles for which the war was fought. 
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